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A MARKET RELIANCE THEORY 
FOR FRAND COMMITMENTS AND OTHER PATENT PLEDGES 
 




Patent holders are, with increasing frequency, making public 
promises to refrain from asserting patents under certain conditions, or to 
license patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (FRAND). These promises or “patent pledges” generally 
precede formal license agreements and other contracts, but are 
nevertheless intended to induce the market to make expenditures and 
adopt common technology platforms without the fear of patent 
infringement. But despite their increasing prevalence, current contract, 
property, and antitrust law theories used to explain and enforce patent 
pledges have fallen short. Thus, a new theory is needed to secure the 
market-wide benefits that patent pledges can offer.  
This Article proposes a novel “market reliance” theory for the 
enforcement of patent pledges. Market reliance is rooted in the equitable 
doctrine of promissory estoppel, but adds a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance borrowed from the “fraud-on-the-market” theory under federal 
securities law. Under this approach, a patent holder’s public commitment 
is enforceable by any participant in the relevant market absent a showing 
that it knowingly rejected the commitment. The market reliance theory 
offers a robust means for enforcing legitimate patent pledges by third-
party market participants, and it extends the effect of such pledges to 
downstream purchasers of patents. As such, the market reliance theory 
could fill a critical gap in the existing patent enforcement landscape and 
give greater assurance to the technology markets that depend on them. 
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[T]he incorporation of patented technology into a standard induces 
market reliance on that patent and increases its value.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Because patent owners are not always well positioned to commercialize their 
patented technology, they routinely cede all or a portion of their exclusive rights to 
others through contractual licenses. Under a patent license, the patent owner agrees 
not to enforce its rights against the licensee in exchange for some value, typically 
including a monetary royalty. A vast network of licensing arrangements 
characterizes modern markets for goods and services of all kinds, from electronics 
and manufactured goods to pharmaceuticals and chemicals.  
But today’s technology marketplaces have seen the emergence of new types of 
promises concerning patents. These promises are not being made in written 
agreements between business partners, but in public fora for the benefit of entire 
markets. The most common of these promises is a commitment to license patents in 
the future on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND).  
FRAND commitments have been most widely recognized in the context of 
technical standards development. Standards such as Wi-Fi, USB, HTTP, and 4G 
ensure that devices manufactured by different vendors can communicate and 
interoperate with one another seamlessly and invisibly to the consumer.2 Most of the 
standards used in the technology marketplace today are developed by groups of 
engineers representing different market participants who collaborate, either in 
person or virtually, at one or more standards development organizations (SDOs).3 
Because SDO participants may obtain patents covering some or all aspects of a 
technical standard, and because SDOs and their participants generally wish to 
promote broad use and adoption of their standards, over the years SDOs have 
developed policies to prevent their participants from enforcing patents to block the 
use of the SDO’s standards or making such use so costly that the standards become 
                                                     
1 Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Motorola Mobility LLC 
& Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120, at 2 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Motorola 
Mobility Proposed Consent Order Analysis], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaanalysis.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/FG3T-CJL2. 
2 For example, the 802.11 series of Wi-Fi® standards developed at the IEEE Standards 
Association (IEEE) enable computers, tablets, smartphones, and other devices manufactured 
by different vendors to communicate with each other in a manner that is essentially invisible 
to the end user. See Kathy Kowalenko, IEEE 802 Committee Celebrates 30th Anniversary, 
THE INSTITUTE (May 6, 2010), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/benefits/standards/ieee-802-
committee-celebrates-30th-anniversary668, archived at http://perma.cc/R23E-NY8X. So 
long as two devices comply with the relevant 802.11 standard, they can communicate with 
minimal user intervention. See id. 
3 For a more detailed discussion of SDO structures and practices, see infra Part II.B. 
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economically undesirable. One of the most prevalent of these policies requires SDO 
participants to license their patents on FRAND terms to any manufacturer that 
wishes to make a product complying with one of the SDO’s standards.4 As discussed 
in more detail in Parts II.A and II.B below, FRAND commitments made in 
conjunction with standards development are intended to assure the market that 
licenses for any patents “essential” to the use of the standard will be available.5  
While FRAND commitments today are most common in the SDO context, they 
are now being made with increasing frequency outside of SDOs and standard setting. 
Moreover, patent holders are making public promises beyond FRAND 
commitments. These include commitments to refrain from asserting patents against 
open source code and other technologies,6  seeking remedies such as injunctive 
                                                     
4  See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION 46–47 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR]; Josh Lerner & 
Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents 2 (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. IDEI-
803, 2013) (“In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most [standard-
setting organizations (SSOs)] require the owners of patents covered by the standard to grant 
licenses on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.”); Jorge L. Contreras, 
Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 
ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 50–51 (2013) (stating that FRAND commitments are the “most 
prevalent” internal policies developed to “mitigate the[] risks” of patent holdup and 
stacking). 
5  A significant literature exists regarding the determination of which patents are 
“essential” to implement a particular standard in a product. In many cases, SDOs permit 
patent holders to self-identify patents that they believe to be essential. See RUDI BEKKERS & 
ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE 
GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 34–47 (2012), available at 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U6FN-XK2E; COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 67–85 (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL]; Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. 
Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 
IND. L.J. 231, 294–304 (2014). But it is not necessarily the case that every patent that a patent 
holder believes to be “essential” to the implementation of a standard will be infringed by a 
product complying with the standard. In some cases, such patents may be found to be invalid. 
In other cases, the scope of a standard or the patent claims may have changed from the time 
that the patent was identified as essential by the patent holder. And in some cases, the patent 
holder may simply be mistaken as to the essentiality of its patent to a standard or may adopt 
an overly conservative strategy in declaring the essentiality of its patents. For all of these 
reasons, “over-declaration” of patents in the standards-setting context is pervasive. See 
Contreras, supra note 4, at 60–62. 
6 Beginning more than a decade ago, IBM and other large firms began to pledge that 
they would not assert substantial portfolios of patents against open source code software. 
IBM, IBM STATEMENT OF NON-ASSERTION OF NAMED PATENTS AGAINST OSS (2005), 
available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3HS7-2ELG. 
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relief,7 and transferring patents to nonpracticing entities.8 This Article refers to these 
public, market-facing promises as “patent pledges,” and they are beginning to 
dominate certain large and heavily litigated sectors of the global technology 
marketplace.9 
Though patent pledges are made by different means and with different outward 
objectives, they share one key feature: they are intended to assure the market, rather 
than specific firms, that the pledgor’s patents will not be used to block adoption of 
a common technology platform. With such pledges in place, market participants are 
more likely to make investments in the covered technology platforms. 10 
Accordingly, it is critical that patent pledges, which offer essential assurances to the 
market and its participants, be binding and enforceable.11 It is also critical that when 
patents are transferred, existing patent pledges continue to bind the transferees. 
Despite the increasing prevalence of patent pledges and their importance to the 
economy, current legal theories do not adequately support the enforcement of these 
promises. The principal theory used to enforce patent pledges to date, particularly in 
the context of standards-related FRAND commitments, is rooted in the doctrine of 
common law contract.12 The theory requires the conceptualization of patent pledges 
                                                     
7 In 2012, Apple, Microsoft, and Google each pledged not to seek injunctive relief 
against implementers of certain standardized technologies to which they had previously 
made FRAND commitments. David L. Newman, Availability of Injunctive Relief in Patent 
Lawsuits as a Result of Standards Obligations, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June 
19, 2012), http://www.arnstein.com/documents/Availability-of-injunctive-relief-in-patent-
lawsuits_ThomsonReuters_6-19-12_Newman.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2R9-
KL2X. 
8  See, e.g., Mark Chandler, Good News for the Innovation Economy: The Tide’s 
Turning Against Patent Trolls, FORBES (Oct. 20, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/10/20/good-news-for-the-innovation-economy 
-the-tides-turning-againt-patent-trolls/, archived at http://perma.cc/W4JF-SHAW (“Cisco in 
the past sold a small number of patents to two [nonpracticing entities] . . . . But we won’t do 
it again.”). 
9  See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, ARIZ. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 2–9); Non-SDO Patent Statements and Commitments, PROGRAM ON INFO. 
JUSTICE & INTELLECTUAL PROP., http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/DR8B-BKR7 (last updated Oct. 15, 2014) (cataloging more than 
150 patent pledges covering thousands of patents). 
10 See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing pretransaction investments by market participants). 
11 As explained in Part IV.B.3, infra, I argue for the enforceability only of pledges made 
with the intention of affecting market behavior. I refer to these as “actionable” pledges. See 
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 34–35). 
12 In this Article, I refer to “contract law” as the traditional Anglo-American common 
law doctrine in which the existence of a contract is characterized by the presence of 
consideration and a bargain between two or more parties. While other doctrines such as 
promissory estoppel are addressed in first-year contract law courses as well as the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, I treat these equitable doctrines, which arose quite 
separately from formal contract doctrine, as distinct. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 90–99 (4th ed. 2004); infra note 97. 
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as contracts between patent holders and SDOs, as to which vendors wishing to 
manufacture and sell products that comply with the standard (and thus infringe 
patents essential to the standard) are third-party beneficiaries.13 While a number of 
commentators14 and a handful of courts15 and agencies16 have adopted this contract-
                                                     
13 See infra Part II.A.2.b. Though this Article characterizes patent holders and product 
manufacturers as the two competing constituencies in debates over patent pledges, it is often 
the case that single firms play both roles in these complex interactions. That is, a firm may 
both hold patents covering a standardized technology (thus pledging to license its own 
patents on FRAND terms) and manufacture products conforming to the standard (thus 
requiring patent licenses from other patent holders).  
14  See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the 
Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 3 
(2011) (stating that “a FRAND obligation is solely the result of a voluntary contract entered 
into by the patent owner on an identifiable date”); Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can 
Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, 
Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 119 (2007) (“The 
enforceability of the FRAND obligation results from the fact that it forms part of a private 
agreement between an IPR owner and an SSO.”); Kassandra Maldonado, Breaching RAND 
and Reaching for Reasonable: Microsoft v. Motorola and Standard-Essential Patent 
Litigation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 419, 420 (2014) (arguing that Microsoft v. Motorola 
“demonstrates the usefulness of contract law as the enforcement mechanism for the 
[F]RAND commitment”); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-
In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 360 (2007) (stating 
that “the [F]RAND promise, embedded in SSO bylaws to which participants agree, is 
primarily a matter of contract law”). Even Professor Mark A. Lemley, who offers several 
other theories under which to analyze FRAND commitments, ultimately concedes that 
contract law, though not without its drawbacks, is likely the dominant analytical framework 
for FRAND. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1923–25 (2002). 
15 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416931, 
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012) (evaluating a dispute over a FRAND commitment as a breach 
of contract); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012) 
(“The court agrees with Microsoft that . . . Motorola has entered into binding contractual 
commitments to license its essential patents on RAND terms.”); Research In Motion Ltd. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (declining to dismiss RIM’s 
breach of contract claim that Motorola failed to offer FRAND terms as promised to ETSI 
and IEEE); Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:06-CV-63, 2007 WL 1202728, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2007) (acknowledging that licensing obligations made to SDO were 
contractual in nature and binding on all members). But see TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson 
Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the working procedures of 
the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite to support the formation of a contract”). 
16 Motorola Mobility Proposed Consent Order Analysis, supra note 1, at 3 (“These 
commitments created express and implied contracts with the SSOs and their members.”). But 
see Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof, No. 
337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327 (U.S.I.T.C. June 13, 2014) (Final) [hereinafter ITC 
InterDigital Initial Determination] (finding that the standards body’s FRAND commitment 
was not a contract). 
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based theory, it falls short on a number of practical and theoretical grounds. Among 
its shortcomings are its failure to account for the diversity of structures through 
which patent pledges are made, and the inherent mismatch between the traditional 
bilateral contract paradigm and the market-wide scope of such pledges. Relying on 
contract theory as the framework for patent pledges stretches contract doctrine well 
beyond its natural contours, leading both to under- and overinclusion of promises 
that ought to be enforced and to a potential distortion of contract theory itself. 
Common law contract is thus a poor framework for the analysis and enforcement of 
patent pledges. 
Antitrust law, too, has been proposed as a means for analyzing and enforcing 
patent pledges. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in particular has 
investigated and brought actions against several firms suspected of violating their 
FRAND commitments.17 But, as discussed in Part III.C below, harm to competition 
(as opposed to harm to particular competitors) may not always occur when patent 
pledges are violated. And proving an antitrust injury has been challenging in the few 
cases in which such theories have been tested.  
Another theory that has been proposed to support the enforcement of patent 
pledges is promissory estoppel.18 Estoppel, rooted in principles of equity, focuses on 
the promise made by a patent holder and a market participant’s detrimental reliance 
thereon, even if the other attributes of a common law contract (mutual assent and 
consideration) are not present.19 Promissory estoppel is an attractive theory because 
it emphasizes the patent holder’s reliance-inducing promise rather than a 
hypothetical bargain between parties. Estoppel thus overcomes many of the 
difficulties that contract doctrine faces in its application to patent pledges. 
Nevertheless, a claim of promissory estoppel requires a showing that the promisee 
actually and justifiably relied on the patent holder’s promise,20 a requirement that is 
difficult to make in complex technology markets characterized by thousands of 
patents and dozens of patent holders.  
When courts and market participants adopt these theories for lack of anything 
better, the result is an unstable foundation for these crucial commitments, an 
incomplete conceptualization of the theoretical basis for their enforcement, and a 
commitment structure that is vulnerable to opportunism and legalistic 
gamesmanship. 21 Thus, a new theory is needed. The theoretical framework 
supporting the enforcement of patent pledges should (a) be broad enough to work 
across a diverse range of organizations and commitment types, (b) recognize the 
                                                     
17 See infra Part III.C. 
18 See, e.g., Bryan James Mechell, Understanding Patent Non-Assertion Agreements: 
The Enforceability of Microsoft’s Open Specification Promise, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 179, 197–99 
(2008); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915. 
19 See infra Part III.B. 
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); infra Part IV.B.1. 
21 Opportunistic parties may attempt to couch their pledges in language intended to 
refute the application of common law contract principles by, for example, stating that no 
third-party beneficiaries are intended. See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
2015] MARKET RELIANCE 485 
centrality of the promise made by the patent holder, and (c) reflect the public 
character of patent pledges as fundamental elements of the broader technology 
infrastructure. Accordingly, this Article proposes a new “market reliance” theory for 
patent pledges that begins with the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel and 
adds to it a rebuttable presumption of reliance adopted from the “fraud-on-the-
market” theory under federal securities law. In short, a patent holder’s public 
commitment either to refrain from enforcing its patents or to license its patents on 
FRAND terms should be enforceable by any participant in the relevant market, 
absent a showing that the commitment was knowingly rejected.22 
The market reliance approach, which focuses on a patent holder’s promise to 
the market at large, avoids the need to search for the formal attributes of contract 
formation and specific reliance where none may be found. Shedding this doctrinal 
baggage and recognizing patent pledges as the market-wide assurances they are 
intended to be, whether through judicial interpretation or legislative enactment, will 
create a stronger and more defensible foundation for the enforcement of these crucial 
commitments.  
This Article proceeds in three principal parts. Part II reviews the justification 
for patent pledges and why they should be enforced as a matter of policy. The diverse 
settings in which patent pledges are made, including FRAND and other 
commitments made within and outside the standards-setting context, are also 
reviewed. Part III assesses the theories that have been advanced to justify the 
enforcement of patent pledges, including common law contract, promissory 
estoppel, antitrust law, and equitable servitude, and discusses each of their 
shortcomings as a general framework for analyzing patent pledges. Part IV develops 
a novel market reliance theory for the enforcement of patent pledges that draws on 
elements of promissory estoppel and the fraud-on-the-market theory recognized in 
federal securities law. This Part also suggests how this theory can be implemented 
in existing law.  
                                                     
22 This Article addresses the doctrinal “glue” that gives effect to FRAND commitments 
and other patent pledges without attempting to solve the complex question of the “meaning” 
of a FRAND commitment. This question has been debated extensively in the literature, 
including in the author’s previous work. For recent academic commentary on the content and 
substance of FRAND commitments, see, for example, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR 
STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52–69 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An 
Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 532–34 (2013); 
Contreras, supra note 4, at 51–54, 92; Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing 
Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 858–59 (2011); 
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: 
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007); Doug 
Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1032–35 (2010); 
Miller, supra note 14, at 357–61; J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: 
Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 951–54 (2013); Daniel G. Swanson & William 
J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and 
Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–7, 16 (2005);.  
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II.  FORM AND FUNCTION OF PATENT PLEDGES 
 
This Part offers a brief description of patent pledges and their function in 
technology-driven markets. Part II.A outlines the public welfare benefits that such 
pledges create, supporting the argument that patent pledges should be legally 
recognized and enforced. Parts II.B and II.C describe the spectrum of forms that 
patent pledges, particularly FRAND commitments, take. Part II.D addresses the 
need for patent pledges to be legally enforceable, both against the original pledger 
and subsequent owners of pledged patents. 
 
A.  The Public Character of Patent Pledges 
 
The patent system as authorized by the U.S. Constitution is endowed with a 
public character: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”23 Its primary 
purpose is not to reward individual inventors, but to benefit the public as a whole. A 
growing number of scholars have recognized the social welfare benefits of the patent 
system as dominant over the private rewards that patents may afford to patent 
holders.24 Likewise, the making and enforcement of patent pledges is not simply of 
concern to the individual patent holder and its prospective licensee, but to the market 
more broadly. Because of the market-wide nature of patent pledges, they take on a 
public character that must be considered when analyzing their enforceability. This 
public character, and the need to enforce patent pledges, is often discussed in terms 
of efficiency and social welfare, covered in Part II.A.1, but also implicates broader 
notions of justice and fairness, which are described in Part II.A.2.  
 
1.  Market-Wide Benefits and Network Effects 
 
Though patent pledges are made by different means with different outward 
objectives, they share one key feature: they are intended to assure the market, rather 
than specific firms, that the pledgor’s patents will not be used to block adoption of 
a common technology platform. The most direct application of this principle arises 
                                                     
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
24 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 326–30 (2003); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public 
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 42–47 (2012) (arguing that patent litigation, in general, 
has a public character); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2014) (“Patent law . . . is not designed to remedy private wrongs. 
Rather, its major aim is to promote innovation.”); Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-
Focused Patent Policy 3–4 (Aug. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481025, archived at http://perma.cc/E 
4LM-A6C7 (“In recent years, . . . [s]cholars have . . . observed a variety of other purposes 
that may be served by the patent system beyond simply rewarding inventive 
accomplishment.”).  
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in the case of interoperability standards, which enable different vendors’ products 
and services to work together. Interoperability standards, when widely adopted, can 
give rise to positive externalities known as network effects that benefit not only the 
vendors of standardized products but also consumers, competitors, and innovators.25 
As observed by Professors John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, “[S]ome degree of 
interoperability is necessary if a product is to thrive in the information technology 
marketplace.”26 Interoperability, they argue, enhances consumer choice, enables 
user creativity, fosters competition in the marketplace, and promotes innovation.27 
Courts and regulators have also recognized the public welfare benefits of 
technical interoperability standards.28 As explained in a joint report by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC, “Industry standards are widely 
acknowledged to be one of the engines of the modern economy. Standards can make 
products less costly for firms to produce and more valuable to consumers.”29 As 
                                                     
25  See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–25 (1985) (noting that “[t]here are many 
products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases 
with the number of other agents consuming the good”); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 87–90 (2012); CARL 
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK 
ECONOMY 45–46 (1999); see also Richard S. Whitt, A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a 
Three-Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 689, 722 (2013) (stating that “the technical standards and protocols . . . that define 
how the Internet and World Wide Web function—all constitute exclusively public goods, 
free for everyone to use without access restrictions”). 
26  JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY 
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 28 (2012). 
27 Id. at 58–59, 70–72, 89–90, 111. 
28 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, 
at *5–7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“Standards lower costs by increasing product 
manufacturing volume, and they increase price competition by eliminating switching costs 
for consumers who want to switch from products manufactured by one firm to those 
manufactured by another.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (2011) [hereinafter FTC, 
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE] (“In many IT industries, interoperability among products and 
their components is critical to developing and introducing innovative products that satisfy a 
range of consumer needs.”); Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Address at the 2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and 
Looking Back on the Last Four Years 16 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AY6N-
9VW6 (“[S]tandards serve the public interest in many ways and collaboratively-set industry 
standards may substantially reduce transaction costs . . . . [And] standards offer our economy 
great efficiencies and offer consumers and businesses new, advanced products . . . .”).  
29  2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 4, AT 6–7; see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 87, 89–91 
(2007) (describing various social welfare benefits provided by standards). 
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such, interoperability standards have become indispensible infrastructural elements 
of the modern technology ecosystem.30 
Similar arguments have been made with respect to the adoption of open source 
software. The broad availability of common open source platforms can give rise to 
significant market-wide cost savings and efficiencies. 31  Widely available open 
source platforms such as the Linux and Android operating systems, promoted by 
many patent holders’ commitments not to assert their rights against these 
technologies, have led to the emergence of robust new markets for compatible 
software and hardware product offerings.32 In this sense, pledges in which patent 
                                                     
30 Professor Brett Frischmann describes infrastructural resources as those that (1) may 
be consumed nonrivalrously over an appreciable range of demand, (2) are subject to demand 
driven primarily by downstream productive activities that require the resource as an input, 
and (3) may be used as an input into a wide range of goods and services. FRISCHMANN, supra 
note 25, at 61. Technical interoperability standards, which are used in a wide range of 
downstream products, but are not themselves the end goal of consumption, fit this 
description. Professor Frischmann also distinguishes among commercial, public, and social 
infrastructural elements. Id. at 67–71. While technical standards are generally provisioned 
by the private sector, they have the character of public goods (a characterization supported 
by Dieter Ernst, America’s Voluntary Standards System—A “Best Practice” Model for 
Innovation Policy? 29–30 (East-West Ctr. Working Papers, No. 128, 2012)). Accordingly, 
Professor Frischmann’s observations regarding the problems inherent in supplying public 
goods, FRISCHMANN, supra note 25, at 69–70, and his proposed approach to addressing their 
undersupply, misallocation, and misoptimization through commons resource management 
strategies, id. at 108–14, may be applicable to technical standards. In fact, Frischmann’s 
“basic lesson” that “[w]hen an infrastructure resource serves as a foundation for the 
production of a wide variety of public and/or social goods, managing access to and use of 
that resource in a manner that does not discriminate in price, quality, or priority among users 
or uses may be an efficient and politically attractive public strategy,” id. at 113, sounds 
remarkably like a FRAND approach, cf. Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and 
Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2007) 
(classifying standards relating to software as “a type of technology semicommons”); 
Timothy Simcoe, Governing the Anti-Commons: Institutional Design for Standard Setting 
Organizations (July 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Utah Law Review) 
(analyzing technical standard setting within Elinor Ostrom’s shared resource (“commons”) 
framework).  
31 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 31–32 (2006); Dirk Riehle, The 
Economic Case for Open Source Foundations, COMPUTER, Jan. 2010, at 86, 87–88. 
32 See, e.g., Elliot Maxwell, Open Standards, Open Source, and Open Innovation: 
Harnessing the Benefits of Openness, INNOVATIONS, Summer 2006, at 119, 132–33 
(discussing the main streaming of open-source software); Bradley M. Kuhn, The State of 
Free Software in Mobile Devices, OPEN SOURCE BUS. RESOURCE, Mar. 2010, at 32, 33–34, 
available at http://timreview.ca/sites/default/files/Issue_PDF/march10_osbr.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/M2VP-DCT8 (“From Google’s point of view, an easy-to-adopt, licensing-
unencumbered platform will broaden their market. . . . Google wants to see Android adopted 
broadly in both Free Software and mixed Free/proprietary deployments.”); David A. 
Wheeler, Why Open Source Software/Free Software (OSS/FS, FLOSS, or FOSS)? Look at 
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holders commit not to assert their patents, or to license them on FRAND terms, 
function in a manner similar to open source copyright licenses that permit free 
modification and redistribution of software products.33  
Another way that patent pledges benefit the market is by encouraging potential 
licensees to make costly investments prior to the formalization of license 
agreements, thereby accelerating market adoption of standardized technologies and 
platforms. Such investments include product design and development, marketing, 
materials, capital equipment, information technology, employee training, and supply 
chain management.34 Once such investments have been made, the potential licensee 
is said to be “locked-in.” In other words, after lock-in it will be less likely to switch 
to an alternative technology due to the amount it has already invested in the patented 
technology. Not surprisingly, lock-in gives the patent holder substantial leverage in 
subsequent license negotiations, a phenomenon that has been termed patent “hold-
up.”35 To encourage beneficial prelicense investment by potential licensees, patent 
holders make pledges, and it is thus important to require patent holders to abide by 
                                                     
the Numbers!, DWHEELER.COM (May 8, 2014), http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/BGN4-3D9H.  
33 See, e.g., Ravi Sen et al., Open Source Software Licenses: Strong-Copyleft, Non-
Copyleft, or Somewhere in Between?, 52 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 199, 199 (2011) (“Open 
source development avoids the inefficiencies of a strong intellectual property regime and can 
create at least as much total welfare as traditional closed licenses.” (citations omitted)). 
34 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 25, at 116–30. Professors Alan Schwartz and 
Robert E. Scott have observed that in the context of construction contracts, both parties may 
make precontracting investments. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability 
and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 690–91 (2007). However, investments 
made by the parties are often unbalanced, tipping more heavily toward the buyer, and 
individual incentives often lead a seller to wait for the buyer to make its initial investment 
before it invests, giving the seller an opportunity to renegotiate after the buyer has already 
sunk costs into the project (i.e., an analog to the problem of holdup). Id. Enforcing 
precontracting commitments enables the buyer to make these investments with some 
confidence that the seller will not subsequently back out of the transaction, rendering their 
initial investments valueless. 
35  See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007) (discussing holdup as a problem in the context of 
cooperative standard setting); Lichtman, supra note 22, at 1033 (arguing that the purpose of 
RAND commitments is to decrease instances of exaggerated royalties due to a holdup in 
negotiations).  
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these pledges. 36  As one major SDO explains, such commitments “help protect 
implementers of a standard against patent hold-up.”37 
Patent pledges play a crucial role in preserving the public benefits generated by 
common technology platforms. They assure market participants that patents will not 
be used to block the manufacture or sale of products conforming to a standard or 
open specification, or containing open source code. As the federal district court 
observed in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,38 such commitments are essential to 
support the widespread implementation of standards and preserve the broad 
interoperability benefits that they confer.39 Accordingly, patent pledges, like the 
standards and common technology platforms that they support, have an inherently 
public, welfare-enhancing character and, as such, should be enforced.40 
 
2.  The Moral Force of Promise 
 
In addition to economic and welfare enhancement rationales for enforcing 
patent pledges, more fundamental arguments regarding fairness and the moral 
weight of promises can also be brought to bear. Early courts in equity are said to 
have enforced promises based on the notion that giving one’s word created a binding 
and enforceable obligation.41 Hume reasoned that “the external sanction of public 
                                                     
36  See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some 
Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of 
Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1101 (“When investment decisions are 
made in reliance on pledges for good faith dealings in the marketplace at some later date, 
those pledges should be upheld, regardless of whether the pledges are made by innovative 
firms in R&D or by downstream firms in commercialization.”). 
37  Standards Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust Competition Policy & Consumers Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) (written statement of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standards Association), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-30-13KulickTestimony.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XW6P-T4K3; see also 2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 4, at 
46–47 (“Some SSOs use licensing rules, such as requiring IP holders to commit to licensing 
on RAND terms, to mitigate holdup.”). 
38 No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
39 See id. at *5–7, *10–11. 
40 Of course, not all patent pledges are directed toward the same types of market 
benefits, and some types of pledges may confer fewer benefits than others. For example, 
several large patent holders have recently pledged not to transfer patents to nonpracticing 
entities or patent “trolls.” See Chandler, supra note 8. While market benefits may, indeed, 
flow from such nontransfer pledges, such benefits would, at a minimum, be of a different 
character than pledges relating to the licensing of patents on FRAND terms (the author 
thanks Professor Greg Vetter for this insight). This Article focuses primarily on pledges that 
promote the interoperability of products and technology platforms. 
41 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 12. But see id. §§ 1.4–1.5, at 9–12 (noting 
that neither Roman law nor early common law courts adopted the view that promises were 
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opprobrium, of loss of reputation for honesty, which society attaches is promise-
breaking, is internalized, becomes instinctual, and accounts for the sense of the 
moral obligation of promise.”42 In the early twentieth century, Roscoe Pound wrote 
that the “moral sentiment of the community” compels the keeping of promises in 
good faith,43 and Professor Morris R. Cohen, even while resisting early twentieth 
century theories about the all-encompassing nature of contract law, grudgingly 
acknowledged that “there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a 
promise, and that a properly organized society should not tolerate this.”44  
Among the most prominent contemporary thinkers about the underpinnings of 
our system of justice is John Rawls, who reasoned that 
 
while we normally think of moral requirements as bonds laid upon us, they 
are sometimes deliberately self-imposed for our advantage. Thus 
promising is an act done with the public intention of deliberately incurring 
an obligation the existence of which in the circumstances will further one’s 
ends. . . . Having, then, availed ourselves of the practice for this reason, 
we are under an obligation to do as we promised by the principle of 
fairness.45 
 
And more recently, Professor Charles Fried has argued that the obligation to 
keep one’s promise is grounded in notions of individual autonomy and trust. “An 
individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally 
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for 
another to expect the promised performance.”46 
While U.S. law surrounding promises, primarily contract and promissory 
estoppel, does not explicitly rely on any moral principle underlying the nature of 
                                                     
per se enforceable); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 574 
(1933) (“At various times it has been claimed that mere promises as such received legal force 
in Hebrew, Greek, early German, and canon law. None of these claims can be justified.”).  
42 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
15 & n.10 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 516–25 
(L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888)). 
43 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1922). 
44 Cohen, supra note 41, at 571. But see id. at 572 (“But while this intuitionist theory 
contains an element of truth, it is clearly inadequate. No legal system does or can attempt to 
enforce all promises.”). 
45 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 347 (1971). This Article is not the first to invoke 
Rawls in discussing the fundamental basis for FRAND commitments. See Sidak, supra note 
22, at 1032 (describing the “Rawlsian depiction of standard setting as a process evolving 
from an original position of ignorance with respect to whether one will eventually be buying 
or selling patented technology”). 
46 FRIED, supra note 42, at 16. 
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promising,47 the laws of some European jurisdictions allow the enforcement of so-
called “unilateral” promises based on “the moral need for the promisor to adhere to 
the promise, and the moral impetus to protect a promisee harmed by a broken 
promise.”48 This principle is also reflected in the Principles of European Contract 
Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference, which describe the subjective 
requirement for a unilateral juridical act, the relevant factor being the consent or will 
of the promisor rather than reliance by the promisee.49 For all of these reasons, there 
is a strong moral impetus driving the enforcement of promises that exists in addition 
to the more instrumental arguments usually marshaled in its favor. 
 
B.  The Range of Patent Pledges 
 
Patent pledges take many forms and are made in a variety of settings.50 Perhaps 
the most common of these structures, or at least the one that most commentators and 
courts have focused on, are those commitments made by patent holders within the 
standards-setting context to license their patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). FRAND commitments, as noted in the 
Introduction, are intended to assure the market that patent licenses will be available 
to manufacturers of standardized technologies on terms that are, at least roughly, 
understood.51 The legal mechanisms by which FRAND commitments are made vary 
considerably. 52  Moreover, the structures of SDOs themselves are surprisingly 
diverse, ranging from small groups of firms focusing on a single product category 
to large, international bodies that produce standards in a broad range of industries.53  
                                                     
47 But see Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE 
L.J. 111, 111 (1991) (arguing that the U.S. doctrine of promissory estoppel is more firmly 
rooted in notions of promise than reliance). 
48  David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS 
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 281, 283 (Vernon Valentine 
Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009) (discussing unilateral promise under Scots law). 
49 Id. at 297.  
50 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 15–21). 
51 See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 28, at 22 (“One way that many 
SSOs attempt to address [patent hold-up] is through licensing rules that require participants 
to agree to license patents on [FRAND] terms.”); ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 
5, at xiv. 
52 See ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5, at 67–68 (describing variants by 
which licensing commitments are imposed); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1955–57 (speculating 
that the diversity among SDO IP policies is likely due to lack of coordination, low 
prioritization of IP issues, and other exigencies, but least of all to intentional design).  
53 See generally Brad Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards 
in the Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS 177, 181–91 
(2012) (describing structural variation among SDOs); Ernst, supra note 30, at 12 (presenting 
a taxonomy of standardization groups). 
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This Part describes the range of structures in which patent pledges (typically 
FRAND commitments) are made. A summary is provided in Table 1 below, ordered 
from the most to the least formal54: 
 
Table 1 
Patent Pledge Structural Variants 
Commitment 
Structure 
Characteristics Prevalence Examples 
1. Multilateral 
Agreement 
Agreement among members 
expressly containing a commitment 




SDO membership agreement contains 
or requires compliance with a 
specified commitment 




SDO bylaws or other policy 
documents require members to 
comply with a specified commitment 
Uncommon VITA58 
ETSI59 
                                                     
54 This list is not intended to be comprehensive. Moreover, several of these variants can 
coexist within the same SDO leading to hybrid structures. See generally Biddle et al., supra 
note 53, at 190–91 (discussing hybrid structures and other models); BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, 
supra note 5, at 27–30 (describing the policy commitment structures of ten SDOs studied). 
Estimates of prevalence are based on data compiled in Biddle et al., supra note 53; BEKKERS 
& UPDEGROVE, supra note 5; Lemley, supra note 14, at 1904–06; and the author’s personal 
observations. 
55 Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 182 (“The USB Promoters Group, a contractual 
arrangement between a small group of major ICT companies, acts as steward for the USB 
specifications . . . .”). 
56  Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement, BLUETOOTH TECH. SPECIAL 
INTEREST GRP., https://www.bluetooth.org/login/register/, archived at https://perma.cc/4LK 
5-S6DH (follow the “Patent & Copyright License Agreement (PDF)” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2015).  
57 Membership Application and Agreement, OASIS (Jan. 20, 2005), https://www.oasis-
open.org/join/membership-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YDW6-EAHC (“The 
Member agrees to abide by the terms of (a) the IPR Policy of OASIS . . . as of the Effective 
Date or as amended thereafter pursuant to . . . this Agreement, and (b) any other policies 
developed by the Board in accordance with the Bylaws (“Policies”) applicable to members . 
. . .”). 
58 VITA Membership Application, VITA, http://vita-beta.com/home/Membership/VITA 
_Member_Registration_Form_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2SS-NYZY (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“By submitting this application, the company and its representative(s) 
agree to adhere to all VITA and VSO policies and procedures.”). 
59 EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE 36 (2014) 
[hereinafter ETSI IPR POLICY], available at http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-
policy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T459-TFVN (outlining ETSI’s intellectual property 
rights policy). 












SDO requires members to comply 
with the ANSI patent policy 
Common61 ASTM62 
5. Letters of 
Assurance (LOA) 
Members must deliver written 
statements of their FRAND 
commitments, if any, at certain points 






Members are given the option to 
declare their intentions or 
commitments 
Rare IETF65 
                                                     
60 BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27; RUDI BEKKERS & ANDY UPDEGROVE, 
SUPPLEMENT 9—ANALYSIS OF THE IPR POLICY OF HDMI FORUM (2012), available at 
http://home.tm.tue.nl/rbekkers/nas/Bekkers_Updegrove_NAS2012---S09---HDMI_Forum. 
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T5CX-HAEE. 
61 This structure is prevalent in ANSI-accredited SDOs outside the ICT sector. See infra 
note 74. 
62 ASTM INT’L, REGULATIONS GOVERNING ASTM TECHNICAL COMMITTEES § 15.4 
(2013) (“ASTM standards submitted to ANSI for approval as American National Standards 
shall conform to the ANSI patent policy.”). 
63 Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/BUR4-CUFK (last visited Jan. 21, 
2015); Patent Statement and Licensing Declaration Form for ITU-T or ITU-R 
Recommendation, ITU (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040 
000020003PDFE.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XK4Z-CPBX. 
64  IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.2 (2015), available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf, archived at http://perma. 
cc/6UE3-XREX (“If the IEEE receives notice that a [Proposed] IEEE Standard may require 
the use of a potential Essential Patent Claim, the IEEE shall request licensing assurance . . . 
from the patent holder or patent applicant.”); Letter of Assurance for Essential Patent Claims, 
IEEE, § D.1.b, https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject/Public/mytools/mob/loa. 
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5JP-3NPE (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter IEEE 
LOA] (demonstrating that a patent holder may also indicate that it is unwilling to license, 
that it will license at no charge, or that it will license at a royalty rate not to exceed a specified 
amount). 
65 Scott Bradner, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology § 6.5 (Internet Eng’g 
Task Force Network Working Grp., Request for Comments No. 3969, 2005), available at 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt, archived at http://perma.cc/D8VS-5RNQ (“[I]t is 
helpful if an IPR disclosure includes information about licensing of the IPR . . . .”). 
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Commitment 
Structure 




Parties make public statements either 
within or outside the SDO context 








(1) Multilateral Agreement: Some SDOs exist solely as contractual 
arrangements among the participants. These “contractual consortia” typically have 
a limited, focused membership and a specific technical goal. 67  FRAND 
commitments among members are often found in the contractual agreements 
establishing these groups. 
(2) Membership Agreement: In SDOs that are formed as incorporated entities, 
participants may be required to sign a written membership agreement with the SDO. 
This agreement may contain an express FRAND commitment or incorporate a 
FRAND commitment that is contained in either the SDO’s bylaws or a separate 
policy document.68 
(3) SDO Bylaws/Policy: Many SDOs have no formal membership agreements, 
but include FRAND commitments in their bylaws or policy documents.69 In some 
cases, participants are required to agree to comply with such bylaws and policies in 
a membership application (often submitted online), or compliance may simply be 
understood as an incident of membership in the organization.70  In some cases, 
FRAND commitments arise only when a participant joins a particular working group 
or technical activity, and commitments may vary by group or activity.71 
(4) Follow American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Policy: All SDOs that 
wish to be accredited as developers of American National Standards72 must comply 
with ANSI’s “Essential Requirements.” The ANSI Essential Requirements permit 
                                                     
66 Interoperability Principles, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/openspecificat 
ions/en/us/programs/interop/interoperability-principles/default.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/69JD-BACG (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
67 See Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 186–87 (describing and providing examples of 
such “contractual consortia”). 
68 See id. at 188–89 (describing and providing examples of “incorporated consortia”). 
69 See id. at 196–97; Lemley supra note 14, at 1906. 
70 See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing the binding nature of 
corporate bylaws and SDO attempts to impose contractual structures absent signed 
agreements). 
71 See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that such SDOs have a 
relatively narrow technical scope). 
72 There are various reasons that SDOs wish to obtain ANSI accreditation, including 
reputational value, acceptance within the broader standardization community, attraction of 
new members, representation at ANSI and ability to influence ANSI policy, and acceptance 
of standards by governmental bodies. See Why Seek Accreditation?, ANSI ACCREDITATION 
SERVICES, https://www.ansica.org/wwwversion2/outside/Benefits.asp, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GLR7-2LDR (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).  
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American National Standards to include technologies covered by known patents, so 
long as the relevant SDO receives a written assurance from the patent holder that a 
license will be made available either without consideration or “under reasonable 
terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.”73 The 
large majority of SDOs, particularly those in fields other than information and 
communications technology (ICT), simply reference the ANSI policy in their own 
membership agreements, bylaws, or policies, rather than adopt a patent policy of 
their own.74 
(5) Letters of Assurance (LOA): SDO rules and procedures may require 
participants to submit a written document (referred to variously as a “letter of 
assurance,” “licensing declaration,” or “written assurance”) stating their intentions 
regarding the licensing of standards-essential patents. 75  Different SDOs require 
participants to submit such LOAs at different times during the standardization 
process, including at the time potentially essential patents are disclosed, prior to 
voting on a standard, or upon request of the SDO.76 Often, such letters must conform 
to a standardized format and allow the participant to check one of several boxes to 
indicate whether its preferred licensing approach is FRAND, royalty-free, “no 
license,”77 or otherwise. This policy structure is relatively common among large 
SDOs operating in the ICT sector.78 
(6) Voluntary SDO Declarations: Some SDOs impose no formal licensing 
commitments on participants, though participants may, at their option, disclose the 
terms on which they are willing to license patents.79 The SDO generally makes 
statements it receives public through an SDO-maintained website. Despite the 
seeming informality of such a system, voluntary disclosures such as these are far 
from uncommon. The best-known SDO adopting this structure is the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the primary developer of standards and protocols 
                                                     
73  AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1(b), at 10 (2014) [hereinafter 
ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS]. 
74 Based on a 2012 review conducted by ANSI staff, approximately 92% of ANSI-
accredited SDOs (250 of 272 policies reviewed) either incorporated the ANSI patent policy 
by reference into their own policies, or reprinted the ANSI policy as their own, with only 
minimal deviations (e.g., substituting the name of the SDO for “ANSI”). Correspondence 
with Patricia Griffin, ANSI General Counsel (Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law 
Review). 
75 BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28. 
76 See id. at 77. 
77 In theory, even a disclosure that no licenses will be available can be helpful to the 
SDO inasmuch as it may encourage SDO participants to “work around” the patents that will 
not be available for licensing. 
78 See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27 (stating that seven of ten SDOs 
studied use this structure). 
79 Such disclosures of intention are sometimes referred to as “Licensing Statements” 
and are distinguished from more binding commitments to license. See ABA PATENT POLICY 
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 72–81. 
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for the Internet.80 With over seven thousand formal standards and policy documents 
published, 81  including the fundamental protocols that enable Internet 
communications, the importance of these standards and this SDO model to the 
modern technology infrastructure cannot be understated. Yet IETF has neither 
membership agreements nor any formal membership status at all.82 
(7) Voluntary Non-SDO Declarations: These are statements made publicly by 
firms engaged in the development of standards or the promulgation of common 
technology platforms, but outside the traditional SDO-based standard-setting 
process. Such statements may be made in a variety of settings and formats, including 
public announcements, press releases, web site postings, speeches, and 
correspondence with SDOs and regulatory agencies. 83  In addition to FRAND 
commitments, these pledges also include clarifications of previously made 
commitments, as well as commitments not to assert patents against certain 
technology categories (e.g., open source software), not to seek injunctions under 
certain patents, and not to transfer patents to nonpracticing entities.84 
 
C.  Process Obligations and Content Obligations 
 
A FRAND commitment is, by definition, a promise to grant a license in the 
future. These commitments fall into two general categories: commitments to grant 
licenses on FRAND terms (“Process Obligations”), and commitments as to the 
license terms that are ultimately granted (“Content Obligations”). Process 
Obligations likely include a patent holder’s obligation to offer a license at a royalty 
rate that is reasonable, to negotiate a license in good faith with the implementer, to 
continue negotiations for some period of time, to refrain from seeking injunctive 
relief to enjoin the implementer’s manufacture and sale of infringing products while 
negotiations are ongoing, and to submit any disputes regarding FRAND terms to an 
independent arbitrator before seeking such injunctive relief. Content Obligations, on 
                                                     
80 See Bradner, supra note 5, § 6.5 (“The inclusion of licensing information in IPR 
disclosures is not mandatory but it is encouraged so that the working groups will have as 
much information as they can during their deliberations.”). Despite the lack of any formal 
FRAND requirement, between 2007 and 2010, IETF participants voluntarily made 378 
FRAND licensing disclosures, representing 79% of all patent disclosures made during the 
period. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and 
Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 182 (2013). 
81 IETF standards and policies are published as “RFCs” on the IETF’s website. Request 
for Comments (RFC), IETF, http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6542-
AGDL (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). When originally used in 1968, the term “RFC” was an 
acronym for “Request for Comments,” but that meaning has become obsolete over the years, 
though the designation RFC has continued. See ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS 
AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 184 (2014). 
82 Admittedly, IETF appears to be unique in this regard, at least among major SDOs. 
See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 18. 
83 See Contreras, supra note 9 (manuscript at 18). 
84 See id. (manuscript at 5, 17–26). 
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the other hand, pertain to the specific royalty rates and other “reasonable” license 
terms to be included in such an agreement. 85  The distinction between Process 
Obligations and Content Obligations becomes important, among other things, when 
assessing remedies for breach of commitments, as discussed in Part IV.B.8 below.	
 
D.  Breach and Enforcement of Patent Pledges 
 
Parts II.A through II.C above describe how and why patent pledges are made. 
This Part discusses why it is important that patent pledges be legally enforceable, 
both as against the original pledger and against subsequent owners of the relevant 
patents.  
 
1.  Enforcing Pledges 
 
Patent pledges are made, whether within or outside of SDOs, to assure the 
market that the patent holder will take, or refrain from taking, certain actions 
regarding its patents. In order to make these assurances meaningful, patent pledges 
must be legally enforceable by at least some category of beneficiaries or “pledgees.”  
To illustrate with a hypothetical, assume that patent holder “Paul” participates 
in “3DPP,” an SDO that develops standards for 3D printing equipment. Paul and 
twelve other companies cooperate within 3DPP to develop Standard I-123 defining 
certain shape characteristics of the nozzle for 3D ink cartridges. The written policies 
of 3DPP require that all participants commit to license any patents they control to 
implementers of 3DPP standards on FRAND terms (a “Type 3” commitment, as 
defined in Part II.B.1 above). Mary is a manufacturer of 3D ink cartridges and wishes 
to sell cartridges that are compliant with Standard I-123. Mary, knowing about 
Paul’s patent, can approach Paul to obtain a license either before or after she designs 
and manufactures her cartridge.86 In either case, Paul has pledged to grant Mary a 
license on FRAND terms. If, for some reason, Paul refuses to grant that license to 
Mary, Mary may need to bring legal action to enforce Paul’s promise to grant the 
license. Of course, Mary’s right to enforce may not be absolute, and various 
extenuating circumstances could excuse Paul from granting a license to her (e.g., 
Mary did not accept Paul’s reasonable license offer, Mary has deliberately avoided 
negotiating with Paul, or Mary does not fit within the category of third parties to 
which Paul has committed to grant a license). But in all of these cases, parties and 
courts require a sound, predictable, and generally applicable legal theory on which 
                                                     
85 Such terms could include requirements that the implementer grant the patent holder 
“reciprocal” licenses, provisions ensuring that the license will be transferred if the underlying 
patents are sold or assigned, and provisions allowing the patent holder to suspend the license 
if the implementer sues it for infringement of its own patents (“defensive suspension”). See 
ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5, at 52–67 (describing many of these terms). 
86 For a discussion of the considerations surrounding the timing of a potential licensee’s 
request for a license from a patent holder, see Contreras, supra note 4, at 54–62. 
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to evaluate and enforce claims for the enforcement of patent pledges. As discussed 
below, none of the theories that are currently used adequately fill this need.  
 
2.  Enforcement and Transfer 
 
Further complicating the enforcement of patent pledges is the fact that, in 
today’s dynamic technology marketplace, patents are often treated as liquid assets 
that are freely transferable from one owner to the next.87 What happens to a patent 
pledge when the original pledgor transfers the underlying patent to a third party? 
That is, do pledges travel with patents, binding their new owners, or are they binding 
only on the original promisor? The question has serious ramifications given the 
number of significant patent transfers that have occurred in recent years.88 Given the 
importance of patent pledges to markets dependent on common technology 
platforms and standards, it is important that such pledges remain binding and 
enforceable even after the original pledgor transfers the relevant patents to a new 
owner. 
In 2008, the FTC brought an action against the purchaser of a standards-
essential patent after the purchaser announced that it would not honor the original 
owner’s commitment to license the patent to all implementers for a flat fee of 
$1,000.89 The action was settled with the new owner agreeing to honor the original 
owner’s pledge.90  
In 2011, bankrupt Nortel Networks, a significant contributor to 
telecommunications and computer networking standards, proposed the sale of 
numerous assets, including approximately six thousand patents, on a “free and clear” 
basis.91 Several product vendors, together with IEEE, raised concerns that Nortel’s 
                                                     
87  See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE PATENT INFORMATICS TEAM, PATENT 
THICKETS: AN OVERVIEW 17 (2011); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 
2012 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–2.  
88 See, e.g., Top 10 Patent Sales of 2012, IDEABUYER (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:19 AM), 
http://www.ideabuyer.com/news/top-10-patent-sales-of-2012/, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
VZ6N-3PUH (listing patent sales totaling $20 billion and encompassing thousands of 
patents). 
89 Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1–5 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 22, 2008); see infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text.  
90 See id. at *6–9. It is interesting to note that the new owner, N-Data, did acknowledge 
that the acquired patent was subject to a FRAND commitment and even committed to license 
the patent on FRAND terms. The new owner simply declined to honor the original patent 
holder’s specific promise regarding the FRAND terms to be offered—a flat license fee of 
$1,000. Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 4407246, at *4–5.  
91 Under Section 363(f) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in 
possession may sell the bankruptcy estate’s assets “free and clear of any interest in such 
property.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138 (KG), 2011 
WL 4831218, at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. July 11, 2011); see also In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 469 
B.R. 478, 488 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“On July 11, 2011, the Court entered an order 
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“free and clear” sale could erase numerous licensing commitments previously made 
by the company.92 Ultimately, the purchaser of the patents, a consortium including 
several large product vendors, agreed to abide by Nortel’s prior licensing pledges.93  
The effect of patent transfers on FRAND commitments also figured 
prominently in the postcommitment statements issued by Microsoft, Apple, and 
Google in February 2012, each of which committed to honor pledges made by prior 
owners of the patents being acquired. 94  Finally, the standards-essential patents 
asserted by the nonpracticing entity Innovatio IP Ventures LLC against a large 
number of motels, cafés, and other retail establishments were acquired from 
Broadcom Corp., an active participant in numerous SDOs.95 Which of Broadcom’s 
obligations carried over to the purchaser of its patents? 
Given the increasing number of patent sales and transfers in the current 
marketplace, it is critical to develop a sound theory to assure the enforceability of 
patent pledges when original pledgors transfer pledged patents to new owners. The 
market reliance theory proposed in Part IV seeks to address this key issue. 
 
III.  CURRENT THEORIES APPLIED TO PATENT PLEDGES 
 
Most commentators today would probably agree that patent pledges, or at least 
some significant percentage of them, ought to be enforced.96 However, there is a 
wide divergence of views regarding the most suitable theory to support such 
enforcement. This Part reviews the primary enforcement theories that have been 
advanced to date and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. 
  
                                                     
approving the sale of Nortel’s Residual Patent Assets, representing some 6,000 patents for 
telecommunications, internet, wireless, and other technology, to Rockstar Bidco, LP.”). 
92 See In re Nortel Networks, 2011 WL 4831218, at *2–3. 
93 Id. at *7. 
94 See Jorge L. Contreras, Guest Post: The February of FRAND, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6, 
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/february-of-frand.html, archived at http://perma 
.cc/J253-XRXJ. 
95 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 
2013). 
96 I am referring to actionable pledges only. See supra note 11. 
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A.  The Contractual Paradigm97 
 
The patent pledges that have attracted the most attention in recent years have 
been FRAND commitments, which courts, agencies and commentators have 
increasingly described as “contractual.”98 This Part reviews the elements of common 
law contract doctrine as it has been applied to FRAND commitments and concludes 
that common law contract is a doctrinal framework ill-suited to address the diverse 
and market-wide nature of such commitments, not to mention the even broader 
category of patent pledges.99 
 
1.  The Case for Common Law Contract 
 
As every first year law student learns, a contract under the common law is an 
enforceable promise that meets certain requirements such as consideration, offer, 
acceptance, and mutual assent.100 Not every promise results in a contract, and not 
                                                     
97 For the sake of expediency, this Article addresses the U.S. common law of contracts 
to the exclusion of contract law of other jurisdictions. See supra note 12. I limit my scope 
advisedly and with some trepidation, as the laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions undeniably play a 
role in the global standardization landscape, and even in U.S. adjudications of standards-
related disputes. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066–71 
(W.D. Wis. 2012) (purportedly applying French law to Apple’s contractual claims against 
Motorola in connection with its participation in the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI)). According to a recent analysis by Professor Thomas F. Cotter, courts 
outside the United States that have considered parties’ FRAND commitments have not found 
contract theory to be a particularly strong theory of enforcement (especially with regard to 
third-party beneficiary status). See Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of 
Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014) 
(discussing cases from Germany, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea). 
98 See sources cited supra notes 14–16. 
99 This is not the only context in which contract law, which took its current shape during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 1.7, at 19, has 
struggled to adapt to other modern modes of private interaction. Perhaps the most prominent 
area in which this difficulty arises is in the law surrounding now-ubiquitous shrinkwrap and 
clickwrap agreements. Most contract scholars readily acknowledge that the common law 
conceits of offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds seldom exist with such agreements, 
yet are still at odds over the best (or any) theory to support the enforceability of these 
agreements. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 627, 628 (2002) (analyzing the differences between analyzing contracts subjectively 
and objectively); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464 (2006) (stating 
that “the enforcement of browsewraps creates problems that need to be resolved”); Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175 
(1983) (stating that “there is little agreement on what principles should control” contracts of 
adhesion).  
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (“[T]he formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and a consideration.”); Id. § 22(1) (“The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange 
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every promise is enforceable. 101  At first blush, the interpretive and normative 
principles of contract law seem well suited to tackling the analysis of FRAND 
commitments and other patent pledges. In most cases, such commitments are 
embodied in a writing that is susceptible to the well-understood tools of contractual 
interpretation. Moreover, the parties engaged in standard setting are typically 
sophisticated commercial firms that enter into complex contractual arrangements on 
a routine basis. The law of contract is thus a familiar and seemingly convenient 
doctrine with which to address the difficult question of whether a party has lived up 
to its commitments. 
The contractual analysis, applied to the hypothetical proposed in Part II.B goes 
something like this: Paul makes a FRAND commitment to the 3DPP SDO. This 
commitment can be construed as a contract between Paul and 3DPP. The contract is 
intended to benefit implementers of 3DPP’s standards. Thus, Mary, who wishes to 
implement the standard in a 3D printer cartridge, should be treated as a contractual 
third-party beneficiary of Paul’s commitment to 3DPP. 
This analysis may, indeed, be valid for some commitments. But a closer 
analysis reveals gaps and incompatibilities that make the general application of this 
contractual approach difficult. This failure stems, at its root, from a fundamental 
mismatch between the paradigmatic contractual transaction (a direct bargain 
between two parties) and the more fluid and multilateral set of relationships that 
characterize the standards-development environment. Figure 1 illustrates the 
differences between the commitment structures under the contract paradigm and the 
standards paradigm. 
  
                                                     
ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by 
the other party or parties.”).  
The Restatement (First) of Contracts defined a category of “unilateral” contracts that 
included transactions such as sealed gift promises, option contracts, and bargains completed 
on one side, such as loans made but not yet repaid. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 12 (1932). The First Restatement’s concept of unilateral contract was not the same as that 
recognized by certain European jurisdictions. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
The Restatement (Second) has eliminated the category of unilateral contracts, as it was found 
to be incoherent and of little value. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. f. 
(1981). Special cases, such as option contracts and contracts that can be accepted by 
performance, are retained, but without reference to the somewhat misleading label of 
unilateral contract. Id. §§ 25, 45. Nevertheless, some commentators continue to refer to 
unilateral contracts as a distinct category. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing 
Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance, and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1, 4 (1992) (arguing that the “distinction remains significant”). I do not address unilateral 
contract separately in this Article, because to the extent that the category is relevant to patent 
pledges, its elements are encompassed by ordinary common law contracts or promissory 
estoppel, which are discussed at length. 
101 Gratuitous promises to make gifts, for example, are typically unenforceable. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) cmt. b, illus. 4–5 (1981). 
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Figure 1 
Contract v. Standards-Setting Paradigm for FRAND 
  
2.  How Contract Falls Short 
 
As suggested above, contract doctrine fails in several fundamental regards to 
address FRAND commitments, not to mention the broader spectrum of patent 
pledges. As shown in Table 1, the structures for implementing FRAND 
commitments are extremely diverse. Such structures vary from those that are almost 
certainly contractual in nature (e.g., Type 1 Multilateral Agreements) to those that, 
due to a lack of mutuality, definiteness or consideration, almost certainly are not 
(e.g., Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations). Thus, while a contractual analytical 
framework may be suitable for a small number of patent pledges, it is unsuitable for 
many others. Part III.A.2.a assesses the general applicability or inapplicability of 
common law contract doctrine to the different types of patent pledges. Parts 
III.A.2.b–c analyze the shortcomings of common law contract theory even in cases 
in which contract law might, as a threshold matter, appear to offer a reasonable 
framework for analyzing patent pledges.  
 
(a)  Contract Formation 
 
(i) Commitments Embodied in Written Agreements (Types 1–2) 
 
Under Type 1 commitment structures (Multilateral Agreements), each SDO 
participant signs a multiparty agreement that contains a FRAND commitment. This 
structure exhibits the formalities of contract formation and is most likely contractual 
in nature. Unfortunately, due to the inherent complexity and inflexibility of 
multilateral agreements and legal issues surrounding liability, intellectual property 
ownership, and handling of funds, few SDOs are actually structured in this 
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manner.102 With Type 2 structures (Membership Agreements), each SDO participant 
executes an agreement with an independently incorporated SDO entity. A binding 
contract is thus formed between the SDO and the participant patent holder. Other 
members of the SDO, as well as nonmembers, are not parties to the contract, but can 
seek to assert rights as third-party beneficiaries (discussed in Part III.A.2.b below). 
But like multilateral agreements, formal membership agreements are relatively 
uncommon among SDOs, particularly those with many memberships.103 
 
(ii) Bylaws and SDO Policy Commitments (Type 3) 
 
Many SDOs utilize Type 3 commitments, which are imposed through the 
SDO’s bylaws and other policy documents, but without formal membership 
agreements.104 The theory is, by joining an SDO, a participant accedes to the SDO’s 
governing policies and thereby becomes bound by its prevailing FRAND 
commitments. There is ample precedent (outside the standards-setting context) 
supporting the theory that members of an organization are obliged to abide by its 
governing documents.105 Yet these obligations do not arise through the application 
of contract law, per se, but the law of business associations.106 The structure and 
scope of such obligations is distinct from the law of contract. 107  Nevertheless, 
                                                     
102 See Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 191. Formal contractual structures are more 
typical of patent pools, which are formed by a limited number of companies, each of which 
has known patents covering aspects of a jointly developed standard. Id. In this and many 
other respects, patent pools are different than voluntary consensus SDOs. 
103 See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1910 (“But relatively few SSOs actually include IP 
policies in a written contract with their members. Indeed, some SSOs don’t have membership 
contracts at all.”). 
104  Some SDOs attempt to impose contractual obligations on members through 
membership applications that are not themselves contracts, but purport to bind the member 
contractually to the SDO’s policies. See, e.g., VITA Membership Application, supra note 58 
(“When accepted by VITA, this application represents a binding contract between the parties 
and commits the applicant to . . . comply with all the terms and conditions of VITA’s Bylaws 
. . . and such rules and policies as the Board of Directors may from time to time adopt                  
. . . .”). 
105 Lemley, supra note 14, at 1911 (stating “the case law strongly suggests that merely 
joining an SSO is sufficient to constitute consent to be governed by the SSO’s bylaws”). 
106 See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572014 archived at 
http://perma.cc/W4WT-NUVH (arguing that corporate charters and bylaws are 
noncontractual in nature); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1910–11 (“[T]he case law strongly 
suggests that merely joining an SSO is sufficient to constitute consent to be governed by the 
SSO’s bylaws.”). 
107 For example, the third-party beneficiary doctrine under contract law does not exist 
in the law of business associations. The implications of this doctrine for FRAND 
commitments are discussed later. See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
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litigants, courts, and commentators have increasingly invoked contract law to 
provide a framework for the enforcement of these FRAND commitments. 
For example, the federal district court in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, 
Inc. 108  considered the FRAND commitment structures used by the European 
Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) and IEEE, two major SDOs. 109 
Though these structures are different (ETSI using Type 3 (SDO Bylaws/Policy) 
commitments and IEEE using Type 5 (Letters of Assurance) commitments),110 the 
court analyzed them in roughly the same manner. It found that a contractual 
relationship was established when the SDO “offered” Motorola, the patent holder, 
the opportunity to participate in standards development, and Motorola “accepted” 
this offer by agreeing to abide by the SDO’s policies.111 
ETSI’s FRAND commitment is imposed by a section of ETSI’s Rules of 
Procedure, to which participants must accede as a part of their general membership 
obligation. Clause 6.1 of the ETSI Rules provides that 
 
When an ESSENTIAL [patent] relating to a particular STANDARD or 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the 
Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give 
within three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is 
prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and conditions . . . .112 
 
The standardized ETSI form on which such irrevocable undertakings are made 
requires the patent holder to state that it is “prepared to grant irrevocable licenses 
under its/their [patents] on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause 
6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy.”113 
ETSI’s policy thus requires that a patent holder make a written declaration that 
it is “prepared” to grant licenses to implementers of ETSI standards on FRAND 
                                                     
108 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
109 Id. at 1068–70. 
110 The picture is further complicated by the fact that ETSI is based in France and its 
governing documents purport to be governed by French law. See id. at 1081–85. The court, 
however, appeared to rely on expert testimony to conclude that French law “requires the 
same general elements” as Wisconsin law, and made little effort to apply French statutory 
law to the case. Id. at 1083. 
111  Id. at 1083–84. (“The intellectual property rights policies of ETSI and IEEE 
constituted offers to Motorola for membership in the organization in exchange for 
Motorola’s ability to participate in developing technical standards. . . . Motorola accepted 
the offers and agreed to be bound by these policies when it joined ETSI and IEEE.”). Because 
the policies of ETSI and IEEE differ in important respects, I will discuss the court’s analysis 
of them separately. 
112 ETSI IPR POLICY, supra note 59, at 35–36. 
113 Id. at 44. 
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terms.114 Even if a participant’s membership in ETSI creates a contractual obligation 
to comply with ETSI policies, this obligation is not an obligation to grant licenses. 
Rather, it is merely an obligation to make a statement that the participant is prepared 
to grant such licenses. The difference is an important one, as it goes to the heart of 
the patent holder’s alleged contractual obligation. 
In fact, the ETSI policy contemplates that members may be unwilling to grant 
licenses under their standards-essential patents, but does not characterize such 
unwillingness as a breach of the policy. Instead, the policy establishes an elaborate 
escalation procedure for addressing such unwillingness that includes consultation 
with the unwilling member, attempting to design around its patents, relying on the 
“good offices” of other ETSI members, and ultimately referring the matter to the 
European Commission for resolution.115 And while the ETSI policy contemplates 
other violations of its policy and establishes a procedure for dealing with them,116 a 
member’s unwillingness to grant licenses on FRAND terms is not deemed to be one 
of those violations. 
Thus, despite the Apple court’s conclusion, it is questionable whether a 
contractual commitment exists under the ETSI policy to grant licenses on FRAND 
terms, as opposed to merely stating a less binding intention to do so. Recently, at 
least one administrative law judge of the International Trade Commission (ITC) 
came to the same conclusion, expressly ruling that the ETSI policy “is not a contract” 
and merely “contains rules to guide the parties in their interactions with the 
organization, other members, and third parties.”117  
 
(iii) Follow ANSI Policy (Type 4) 
 
As noted in Part II.B(4), the ANSI Essential Requirements provide that 
American National Standards may include technologies covered by patents, so long 
as the adopting SDO receives a written assurance from the patent holder that a 
license will be made available either without consideration or “under reasonable 
terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.”118 
This is ANSI’s FRAND commitment, so to speak. However, it is not a commitment 
                                                     
114 Though the ETSI policy is silent as to whom a patent holder must be prepared to 
grant such licenses, it appears from the context that this obligation is intended to extend to 
any entity that requests a license. 
115 Id. at 38. 
116 Id. at 41 (“Any violation of the POLICY by a MEMBER shall be deemed to be a 
breach, by that MEMBER, of its obligations to ETSI. The ETSI General Assembly shall have 
the authority to decide the action to be taken, if any, against the MEMBER in breach, in 
accordance with the ETSI Statutes.”). 
117 ITC InterDigital Initial Determination, supra note 16, at *75. See also TruePosition, 
Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the 
Working Procedures of the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite to support the 
formation of a contract”). 
118 ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 73, § 3.1.1(b)(ii), at 10.  
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by an SDO participant, but by the SDO itself. Thus, under the ANSI policy, the SDO 
may not include a patented technology in a standard unless the SDO has received a 
written licensing assurance from the patent holder. The patent holder is not bound, 
even superficially, by the ANSI policy. While in theory the patent holder may create 
a binding contractual commitment to the SDO through the “written assurance” 
required by the ANSI policy, neither the scope nor the legal nature of this written 
assurance is specified, either in the ANSI policy or in most SDO policies.119 There 
is thus a fundamental mismatch between the party purportedly obligated under the 
ANSI policy (the SDO) and the party holding standards-essential patents. 
Accordingly, it would be a stretch to attempt to use contract law to enforce a Type 
4 commitment against a patent holder. 
 
(iv) Letters of Assurance (Type 5) 
 
Type 5 (Letters of Assurance or “LOA”) commitments are contained in written 
documents or “assurances” delivered by a patent holder to an SDO. Under such 
policies, the SDO does not generally mandate FRAND licensing independently of 
such assurances. In this respect, Type 5 commitments differ from Type 3 (SDO 
Bylaws/Policy) commitments, though they often appear similar. In SDOs with 
bylaws-based commitments such as ETSI’s, the SDO requires that a patent holder 
make a FRAND commitment contained in a letter. In SDOs with LOA-based 
commitments, such as IEEE’s, the SDO merely requires that the patent holder 
deliver a letter stating its licensing intentions, which may or may not contain a 
FRAND commitment. The time at which an LOA must be delivered varies by SDO, 
as does the wording of each SDO’s form of LOA.  
IEEE requires that the patent holder submit an LOA in which it checks a box 
describing its patent licensing “position.”120 That position may reveal that the patent 
holder (a) will grant licenses without compensation, (b) will grant licenses on 
FRAND terms, (c) will not enforce any patent covering the relevant standard against 
an implementer, or (d) is “unwilling or unable to grant licenses”121 with respect to 
such patents. The fact that a patent holder is free to select option (d) and decline to 
make any commitment regarding the licensing of its patents indicates that the 
granting of a license cannot form part of the membership bargain between the patent 
holder and IEEE. Any promise inherent in this selection would likely be considered 
made “in the alternative” and thus lacking in consideration. 122  Basing the 
enforcement of such commitments on common law contract principles is thus 
tenuous. 
 
                                                     
119 In this respect, Type 4 (Follow ANSI Policy) commitments differ markedly from 
Type 5 (Letter of Assurance) commitments in which the SDO usually prescribes the form of 
LOA. 
120 IEEE LOA, supra note 64, § D.1.  
121 Id.  
122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. b (1981) (discussing illusory 
and alternative promises). 
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(v) Voluntary Declarations (Types 6–7) 
 
Under Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations, a patent holder may voluntarily 
commit to offer FRAND or other licensing terms with respect to standards-essential 
patents, or state its current intention to offer such terms. Typically, the patent holder 
can unilaterally and voluntarily disclose this intention in any form it chooses, either 
within or outside of an SDO. It would be difficult to classify such disclosures as 
contractual obligations, as most elements of a formal contract (mutual assent, 
consideration, and even a counterparty) are lacking. Even further removed from any 
credible application of contract law are Type 7 statements that patent holders make 
to the public at large outside any formal or informal SDO structure. These statements 
could not, under even the most generous interpretation, be characterized as bilateral 
common law contracts. 
 
(b)  Third-Party Beneficiaries 
 
In the context of disputes over standards-essential patents, it is seldom the case 
that SDO wishes to enforce the patent holder’s FRAND commitment. SDOs are 
generally small, not-for-profit organizations that rarely have the resources or 
inclination to engage in patent litigation. Moreover, SDOs typically seek to remain 
neutral in disputes between their members. In practice, another firm—usually a 
product manufacturer or vendor accused of infringing a pledged patent—typically 
raises a patent holder’s breach of a FRAND commitment as an affirmative defense 
to patent infringement.123 There appears to be no case in which a breach of contract 
claim was brought against a patent holder absent the patent holder’s assertion124 of 
a patent against the claimant. For all of these reasons, the SDO is unlikely to enforce 
a FRAND commitment against a breaching patent holder. Instead, the party wishing 
to enforce the FRAND commitment is usually a third party that wishes to implement 
a standard using technology that infringes one or more patents. To do so under a 
common law contract theory, the manufacturer must invoke the third-party 
beneficiary doctrine. 
  
                                                     
123 See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915. 
124 Asserting a patent does not necessarily require the formal initiation of litigation. 
Patent assertion can manifest itself through aggressive licensing tactics, demand letters, and 
the like. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD 
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013) (“In addition to lawsuits, patent assertion occurs 
without firms ever filing lawsuits . . . .”). Thus, in Microsoft, Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
Microsoft sued for breach of contract after Motorola threatened, but had not actually 
initiated, suit against Microsoft for infringement of various standards-essential patents. See 
No. C10–1823JLR, 2012 WL 395734, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2012).  
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(i) Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine 
 
A nonparty’s right to enforce a contract is difficult to reconcile with the 
common law contract doctrine requiring privity between contracting parties.125 But 
beginning with the seminal 1859 New York case Lawrence v. Fox,126 and due in 
large part to the advocacy of Professor Arthur Corbin in the early twentieth 
century,127 third parties in the United States are now generally recognized as having 
rights to enforce contracts made for their benefit.128 As described by the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts: 
 
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of 
a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to 
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of 
the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an 
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary [creditor 
beneficiary]; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to 
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance [donee 
beneficiary].129 
 
                                                     
125 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1364–
65 (1992) (noting that third parties, under the classical view, lack contractual privity with the 
promisor and give no consideration for the promise, eliminating any contractual basis 
supporting enforcement).  
126 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In the case, Holly loaned $300 to Fox so that Fox could repay 
a debt to Lawrence. Id. at 269. When Fox failed to do so, the New York Court of Appeals 
allowed Lawrence to sue under the contract between Holly and Fox, despite his lack of 
contractual privity with either of them. Id. at 274–75. For a detailed account and 
interpretation of the case, see Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of 
the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116–45 (1985). 
127 See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 
1008, 1020–22 (1918) (containing the first of six articles written by Corbin on the subject of 
third-party beneficiary rights); Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent 
Requirement in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67, 68 n.6 (describing 
the historical controversy over third-party beneficiary rights).  
128 In the United Kingdom, third parties still lack any common law right to enforce 
contracts to which they are not parties, though this right may be conferred by contract. See 
LAW COMMISSION, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES 
6, 15 (1996), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc242_privity_of_con 
tract_for_the_benefit_of_third_parties.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7ZH-B5JG. This 
right is, however, recognized under statute under English law today. Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31, § 1 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.). 
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (emphasis added). The 
formulation of the Restatement (Second) in this area has been criticized, among others, by 
Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg, who has called it “seriously flawed.” Eisenberg, supra 
note 125, at 1382–83. 
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Under the formulation of the Second Restatement, a third party’s capacity to 
enforce a contract depends on whether that party is an intended beneficiary or an 
incidental beneficiary of the contract.130 If the contracting parties did not intend that 
a third party benefit, then the third party is merely an incidental beneficiary and 
unable to enforce the contract. 131  If, on the other hand, the contracting parties 
intended that a third party benefit from performance of the contract, then that third 
party is an intended beneficiary and is entitled to enforce the contract.132 
In most cases involving third-party beneficiaries, the intended beneficiary is 
known to the contracting parties and is either a single person or a defined group of 
persons (such as an individual’s heirs or legatees). 133  The failure to identify a 
specific beneficiary, however, is not fatal.134 Thus, if B promises to pay anyone from 
whom A purchases an automobile, and A purchases an automobile from C, then C 
may bring an action against B as the intended beneficiary of the contract, even 
though C’s identity was not known to A or B at the time the contract was made.135 
In some cases, however, larger and less cohesive groups have sought to assert 
contractual rights as third-party beneficiaries. These include members of the public 
who have sued to enforce government contracts entered into for the “public 
benefit.”136 For example, the residents of a neighborhood might seek to enforce a 
contract between their municipal government and a public works contractor after the 
contractor fails to extend a promised sewer line to their neighborhood. The theory is 
that, because the municipality and the contractor entered into the contract for the 
benefit of the neighborhood residents, they should have the right to enforce it as 
third-party beneficiaries. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, members of the public brought an increasing number 
of third-party beneficiary actions to redress a variety of governmental obligations 
otherwise lacking a private right of action.137 This tactic enjoyed some early success 
                                                     
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).  
131 An incidental beneficiary “acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the 
promisor or the promisee” to sue on the contract. Id. § 315 (emphasis added). For example, 
“B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A’s land. C’s adjoining land would be 
enhanced in value by the performance of the contract. C is an incidental beneficiary” Id. § 
302 cmt. e, illus. 16. 
132 Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 622 (Md. 1985). 
133 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 55 (1978). 
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308 (1981) (“It is not essential to the 
creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing 
the promise is made.”). 
135 Id. § 308 cmt. a, illus. 2. 
136 See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 1406. 
137 Waters, supra note 126, at 1184–89 (discussing examples arising in the areas of 
Medicare benefits, public housing, and public education); see also Karen Melcher, Note, 
Contract Law—Absent Contractual Language Demonstrating an Undertaking Directly for 
the Benefit of a Designated Class of Persons, a Person Cannot Establish Third-Party 
Beneficiary Status, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 957, 957–65 (2000) (describing a third-party 
beneficiary action against the government). 
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but was eventually viewed as going beyond the permissible limits of the common 
law third-party beneficiary doctrine.138 The Second Restatement recognizes that 
while government contracts may be intended to confer a public benefit,139 individual 
members of the public should not be entitled to enforce government contracts or 
recover damages for their breach, unless a specific remedy to that effect is expressed 
in the contract or a private right of action for the breach already exists.140 
The third-party beneficiary doctrine is currently recognized throughout the 
United States,141 though application of the doctrine is not uniform,142 and not all 
states adhere to the Second Restatement’s formulation.143 Unlike the Restatement, 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly extend rights to third-
party beneficiaries of contracts for the sale of goods, except in the narrow case of 
enforcing express and implied warranties.144 
Further eroding the third-party beneficiary doctrine, courts have held that 
contracting parties can avoid the claims of putative third-party beneficiaries by 
disclaiming application of the doctrine through standardized, boilerplate contract 
                                                     
138 See, e.g., Henry v. Phila. Adult Prob. & Parole Dep’t, No. 05-4809, 2007 WL 
2670140, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2007) (noting that Pennsylvania “prohibits such an 
expansive interpretation of third-party beneficiary rights”). 
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 cmt. a (1981). 
140 Id. at § 313(2) (“In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or 
governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to 
contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from 
performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such 
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages 
and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with 
the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.”). 
141 Id. ch. 14, intro. note. 
142 See Patience A. Crowder, More than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary 
Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 301 
(2010) (stating that decisions interpreting third-party beneficiary doctrine are inconsistent). 
143 See, e.g., Jason Curry, Comment, No Appropriate Beneficiary Left Behind: How to 
Refine Texas Third Party Beneficiary Law to Include All Appropriate Intended Beneficiaries, 
40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 183, 186 (2007) (noting that Texas law combines aspects of both the 
First and Second Restatements in its law regarding third-party beneficiaries). Interestingly, 
the third-party beneficiary doctrine is still not recognized in the United Kingdom, which 
relies heavily on the privity requirement in contract. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE 
PATHS TO PRIVITY: A HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW 
165–67 (1992) (citing Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.) 764); see also 
Waters, supra note 126, at 1152 n.159 (citing Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & 
Co., [1915] A.C. 847). 
144  U.C.C. § 2-318 (2008) (identifying the narrow exception of “Third Party 
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied”); see also Gary L. Monserud, Blending the 
Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Beneficiaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 205–
06 (2000) (arguing that U.C.C. remedies should, in some cases, be available to third-party 
beneficiaries of sales contracts); Powers, supra note 127, at 114–25 (applying third-party 
beneficiary analysis to sales of goods governed by the U.C.C.). 
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terms. 145  Thus, an opportunistic party that did not wish to give third-party 
beneficiaries the benefit of its contract, even if such a benefit were contemplated, 
could defeat such rights through the inclusion of a disclaimer in its contract. 
 
(ii) Applying the Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine to FRAND Commitments 
 
In the case of FRAND commitments, a patent holder makes a promise to an 
SDO that it will grant licenses to all who wish to implement a standard. Because 
SDOs have proven reluctant to enforce such commitments directly against patent 
holders, it has fallen to implementers to enforce the patent holders’ FRAND 
commitments as third-party beneficiaries. At least two federal district courts have 
adopted this theory,146 and some commentators have viewed the theory favorably.147  
However, application of the third-party beneficiary doctrine to FRAND 
commitments presents serious doctrinal challenges. To apply the doctrine, one must 
first determine whether the contracting parties intended to confer on one or more 
third parties the direct benefit of their contract. The strongest indicator of such intent 
is an express statement in the contract itself. A few SDOs do include statements 
favoring third-party beneficiaries in their membership agreements, bylaws, or 
intellectual property policies.148 Most, however, have not done so (yet). For the 
majority of SDOs, the intent to confer third-party beneficiary status must thus be 
inferred from other language. 
But as discussed in Part III.A.2.b.i above, it is not enough that the parties to a 
contract intend to benefit one or more third parties. In order to claim third-party 
beneficiary status, the third party must be identified or discernible with sufficient 
specificity. Depending on their construction, FRAND commitments can be made for 
                                                     
145 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an express contractual clause captioned “No Third-Party Beneficiaries” clearly 
indicated the parties’ intention not to permit third parties to enforce the contract between 
them). 
146 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002–03 (W.D. Wash. 
2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2012); 
see also ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-Tel., Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL 33520483, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999) (declining to dismiss claim for breach of a FRAND commitment 
brought by nonmember of SDO against patent holder). 
147 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 280–81 (“[A] FRAND commitment in which 
the patent holder agrees to license on FRAND terms to anyone who intends to implement 
the standard clearly creates a category of intended beneficiary for all potential adopters of 
the standard.”). But see Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915 (expressing skepticism with respect 
to third-party beneficiary theory in SDO context). 
148 See, e.g., WIRELESS INNOVATION FORUM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY § 1.3 
(2012), available at, http://www.wirelessinnovation.org/assets/documents/policy_on_ 
intellectual_property_rights.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5RLG-5PFN (“Each . . . 
[implementer] shall be a third party beneficiary of all such obligations.”). 
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the benefit only of members of the SDO,149 or members as well as nonmembers (i.e., 
all manufacturers of products implementing a standard).150 
SDO members can make a stronger case for third-party beneficiary status than 
nonmembers can.151 Because most SDOs are membership-based associations, it is 
not hard to envision an SDO wishing to confer a benefit on all of its members 
through a network of FRAND commitments, just as it does through other activities 
such as meetings, professional networking, and publications. The question becomes 
somewhat more complex when considering members who join the SDO after the 
FRAND commitment is made (and perhaps did not even exist at that time) and 
members who exit the SDO. Did the patent holder and SDO intend to extend third-
party beneficiary rights to these entities at the time the commitment was made? As 
discussed above, it is not necessary that beneficiaries be specifically identifiable at 
the time a promise is made, but at some point, either in terms of number of 
beneficiaries or time elapsed since the promise was made, the parties’ intention with 
respect to beneficiaries becomes attenuated. 
A more challenging case for third-party beneficiary status arises with respect 
to nonmembers of the SDO. Many of the justifications that exist for an SDO to 
confer benefits on its own members do not exist with respect to nonmembers. And 
it can be argued that extending the benefits of FRAND licensing to nonmembers 
reduces both nonmembers’ incentives to join the SDO and a competitive advantage 
that SDO members might have over nonmembers. Moreover, nonmembers are not 
themselves bound by the policies and agreements of the SDO and are thus not 
required to grant licenses to SDO members. For all of these reasons, an SDO’s intent 
to benefit nonmembers, absent an express indication of this intent, is questionable. 
Nevertheless, many FRAND commitments require that patent holders grant 
licenses to all implementers of a standard, whether or not they are members of the 
SDO.152 The reason, of course, is that the marketplace, including the SDO and its 
members, benefit from the broadest possible adoption of a standard. As the court in 
                                                     
149 The membership structure of some SDOs is complex and includes multiple levels 
of membership having different rights, privileges, and obligations. See BEKKERS & 
UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28–29. What is more, some SDOs, notably IETF, have no 
formal membership structure at all. However, for purposes of this discussion, I will assume 
that SDOs have a single membership category. 
150 See id. at 27 (indicating eight of ten SDOs studied had FRAND commitments that 
applied to all implementers, rather than only members of the SDO). 
151 Microsoft’s membership in IEEE and ITU appears to have been a factor leading the 
court to treat Microsoft as a third-party beneficiary of Motorola’s commitments to those 
organizations. Microsoft, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 999–1002; see also Henry E. Smith, Property 
as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 1057, 1074 (2013) (“[C]ontractual solutions provide only partial or no protection to 
parties outside the SSO who may adopt the standard.”); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915 
(discussing favorable arguments for SDO member treatment as third-party beneficiaries).  
152 See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27.  
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Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.153 explained, “[FRAND] commitments are clearly 
designed to benefit potential licensees of Motorola’s standard essential patent[s] by 
ensuring that such patents are readily accessible to everybody at reasonable rates.”154 
But like members of the public who benefit from a government-funded public works 
project, the SDO nonmembers who benefit from FRAND licenses may not be 
entitled to enforce those commitments as third-party beneficiaries under the 
common law of contract. 
 
(c)  Indefiniteness 
 
The common law has traditionally treated contracts whose material terms are not 
specified with sufficient certainty as lacking both mutual assent and evidence of the 
parties’ intent to be bound.155 As such, indefinite contracts have generally been held 
to be unenforceable.156 When parties reach a preliminary agreement but contemplate 
further negotiation or the execution of a formal contract, this preliminary expression 
of intent (an “agreement to agree”) typically does not create a binding contract 
either.157  
FRAND commitments are, by their very nature, indefinite. They specify only 
that a license must be granted on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory.” Key terms such as price, duration and scope are left open to future 
negotiation. Of course, such omissions are not always fatal to contract enforceability, 
and both the Uniform Commercial Code158 and courts interpreting common law 
                                                     
153 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012). 
154 Id. at 1033 (emphasis added). 
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(3) (1981) (“The fact that one or more 
terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of 
intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance”); see also Joseph 
Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (“[B]efore the 
power of law can be invoked to enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific 
so that what was promised can be ascertained. Otherwise, a court, in intervening, would be 
imposing its own conception of what the parties should or might have undertaken . . . . Thus, 
definiteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law”). 
156 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1); see also Joseph Martin, 417 
N.E.2d at 543 (“[D]efiniteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law. 
Impenetrable vagueness and uncertainty will not do”). 
157 JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 383 (9th ed. 2008). 
New York law, for example, does not find an enforceable contract when parties leave 
material terms for future negotiation. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir. 1996). 
158 U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2008) (“The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for 
sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the 
time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the 
parties and they fail to agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market 
or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or 
recorded.”). 
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contracts 159  have permitted parties to leave certain key terms open for future 
determination. Nevertheless, FRAND and other commitments embodied in SDO 
policies could suffer from too much indeterminacy to be found enforceable. Several 
recent judicial decisions critical of the vagueness and indeterminacy of SDO policy 
language underscore this point.160 
 
3.  Conclusions Regarding Contract 
 
Common law contract doctrine fails in several respects as an effective structure 
for the general enforcement of FRAND commitments and other patent pledges. 
Except in the relatively rare case of formal membership agreements among SDO 
participants, the application of common law contract doctrine to FRAND 
commitments requires doctrinal gymnastics and thus represents a potentially 
unpredictable and outcome-based distortion of traditional contract law principles.161 
Table 2 summarizes the general applicability of contract doctrine to the seven 
basic commitment types identified in Table 1. 
  
                                                     
159 See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 575–76 (Joseph 
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (noting cases in which the following “agreement[s] as to price 
[were] held too indefinite for enforcement: a promise to divide profits ‘upon a very liberal 
basis’; to pay ‘good wages’ to a teacher; to pay [an amount] ‘not exceeding $300 [a] week’; 
. . . to pay an amount ‘commensurate with the earnings of the company’ in addition to salary; 
[and] to pay ‘a satisfactory amount’” (quoting Butler v. Kemmerer, 67 A. 332, 333 (Pa. 
1907); Fairplay Sch. Tp. v. O’Neal, 26 N.E. 686, 686 (Ind. 1891); United Press v. N.Y. Press 
Co., 58 N.E. 527, 527–28 (N.Y. 1900); Donovan v. Bull Mountain Trading Co., 198 P. 436, 
439 (Mont. 1921); Mackintosh v. Kimball 101 A.D. 494, 497–98 (N.Y. 1905))). 
160 See TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa. 
2013) (finding that the Working Procedures of the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite 
to support the formation of a contract”); Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 
F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003) (finding a “staggering lack of 
defining details” in the relevant SDO patent policy and thus exonerating conduct alleged to 
violate the spirit of the policy). 
161 See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1917, 1925 (noting that contract law has “loopholes” 
and does not offer effective remedies for breach of SDO commitments); Cotter, supra note 
97, at 350 (stating that, even if a court does apply contract law principles to a FRAND 
commitment, “some of the more ambitious interpretations that have been proposed in the 
literature may read too much into the nature of the FRAND commitment, simply as a matter 
of contract law”). 
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Table 2 
Patent Pledge Variants and Contract Applicability 
Commitment Type Applicability of Contract Doctrine Prevalence 
1. Multilateral 
Agreement 
Commitment is contractual among 
members; nonmember implementers 





Commitment is contractual between 
patent holder and SDO; member and 
nonmember implementers must rely on 
TPB theory 
Uncommon 
3. SDO Bylaws/Policy Commitment is either corporate or 
contractual in nature; exists between 
patent holder and SDO; member and 
nonmember implementers must rely on 
TPB theory 
Uncommon 
4. Follow ANSI Policy No affirmative commitment on patent 
holder, merely a prescription for SDO 
process; LOAs provided by members are 
probably not contractual 
Common 
5. Letters of Assurance 
(LOA) 
Obligation to provide LOA is a 
contractual commitment to SDO; 
FRAND commitment contained in LOA 
is probably not contractual 
Common 
6. Voluntary SDO 
Declarations 
Voluntary licensing declarations are 




No contract Uncommon but 
increasing 
 
It is worth asking why contract law, which is so well suited to the commercial 
relationships that pervade modern economic life, 162  fails in terms of FRAND 
commitments and other patent pledges. There are several possible explanations. 
First, patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in particular, were not initially 
conceived as bilateral agreements between parties. As discussed in Part II.A, these 
                                                     
162 It is a mainstay of legal practice that the law of contract governs the complex 
network of commercial activity characterizing the global economy. Contracts, which 
memorialize the obligations and expectations of sophisticated transacting parties, form the 
basis for private interaction in such industries as finance, manufacturing, energy, 
transportation, and entertainment. And while governmental regulation and doctrines arising 
under antitrust, consumer protection, and unfair competition law have a significant impact 
on private conduct in such industries, the primary mode of interaction among commercial 
participants is largely through contract. Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: 
What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 
DUQ. L. REV. 255, 257 (2000). 
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pledges have a public character and seek to offer assurances to the market at large 
rather than to reflect bilateral negotiated terms between private parties. Second, there 
is a wide diversity of structures through which FRAND commitments and other 
patent pledges are made. While traditional contract doctrine is readily applicable to 
some of these structures (Type 1 and 2 Policies), it becomes progressively less 
applicable as the level of formality within the SDO decreases. Finally, contract 
theory does not adequately account for the voluntary pledges issued by patent 
holders, statements in which regulators and the market put significant weight upon, 
but are not cognizable under traditional contract doctrine.  
 
B.  Promissory Estoppel 
 
1.  Pledges as Promises 
 
A patent pledge is a promise. It may not be a promise that meets the strict 
requirements for common law contract formation, but it is a promise nonetheless, 
and under most circumstances, it should be enforced. For centuries, actions in equity 
have existed alongside actions in law to enable courts to serve the ends of justice in 
a flexible manner.163 The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents a party from 
shirking a promise that should be enforced though it lacks consideration, mutual 
assent, or other formal requirements of contract law.164 The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts summarizes the basic elements of promissory estoppel, as observed in 
the United States today,165 as  
 
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise.166 
 
                                                     
163 See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 112–33 (3d ed. 
1990) (discussing the historical evolution of the courts of law and equity); Henry E. Smith, 
An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 1, 3 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/W9BE-DKKS (noting that courts of equity existed as separate 
courts until the early twentieth century). 
164 3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.3, at 9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
rev. ed. 1996) (“[A]n informal promise may be enforceable by reason of action in reliance 
upon it, even though that action was not bargained for by the promisor and was not performed 
as an agreed exchange for the promise. This is demonstrated by decisions of the common-
law courts from the very beginnings of the action of assumpsit, by the decrees of courts of 
equity making a very flexible use of the doctrine of ‘estoppel’ . . . .”).  
165 All U.S. states and territories recognize promissory estoppel. Eric Mills Holmes, 
Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 265, 270 (1996). 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).  
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Under the Restatement (Second) formulation, a finding of promissory estoppel 
turns on the existence of a promise and the promisee’s subsequent detrimental 
reliance. 167  In assessing reliance, “[t]he law may not question the adequacy of 
consideration but it must (by definition) question the adequacy of reliance.”168 To 
this end, the doctrine of promissory estoppel only requires promisors to honor 
promises that others have actually and justifiably relied upon.169 The mere statement 
“I shall pay you $1,000 tomorrow” creates no estoppel unless the promisee 
reasonably relies on the promise, for example, by contracting to buy a new television 
based on his expectation of receiving $1,000. If the promisee does nothing but wait 
for the $1,000 to arrive, and incurs no other obligation and foregoes no other 
opportunity in reliance on the promise, then no detrimental reliance has occurred 
and no estoppel will be imposed. The only instances in which estoppel may be found 
without proof of actual reliance are the narrow cases of charitable subscriptions and 
marriage settlements.170 In all other cases, actual reliance must be established. 
As discussed in Part II.A, one of the principal reasons that patent holders make 
patent pledges is to assure the market that standards and other common technology 
platforms will be available for broad adoption on reasonable terms, notwithstanding 
the existence of patents. Implementers invest substantial sums in the development, 
manufacturing, sale, and marketing of products incorporating standards, and are 
encouraged to do so, at least in part, on the basis of such commitments.  
The doctrine of promissory estoppel offers implementers a more attractive 
vehicle than contract law to enforce FRAND commitments and other patent pledges 
against those who make them.171 Estoppel avoids many of the technical hurdles 
                                                     
167 BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 8.6.1, at 198 (3d 
ed. 2004).  
168 DANIEL J. BUSSEL & ARTHUR I. ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 543 
(8th ed. 2011). 
169 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 95. But see Yorio & Thel, supra note 47, at 162, 
167 (arguing that the gravamen of promissory estoppel is rooted in the quality of the promise 
made rather than reliance thereon). 
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981) (stating that “[a] charitable 
subscription or a marriage settlement is binding . . . without proof that the promise induced 
action or forbearance”). The traditional example of a marriage settlement is a father’s 
promise to convey a parcel of land to his son in anticipation of his pending marriage. See 
Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 78 N.E. 943, 943, 945 (N.Y. 1906); see also Johnston v. 
Spicer, 13 N.E. 753, 753–54, 757 (N.Y. 1887) (stating that the man promised to convey 
property to his soon-to-be wife in the event that he died without issue by the marriage). 
171 See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915–16 (giving a generally favorable view of claims 
based in promissory estoppel to address violations of SDO policies). The FTC, however, 
declined the opportunity to apply an estoppel theory in its action against Dell, which 
allegedly breached a commitment to license patents relating to the VL-bus standard 
developed at the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA). See Dell Computer 
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 616–19, 633–34 (1996). Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting, 
argued that if Dell’s certification, which stated that it did not hold patents covering the VL-
bus standard, was misleading, then Dell should be estopped from asserting its patents against 
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imposed by common law contract doctrine and does not depend on the concept of 
bilateral bargaining to be enforced. To enforce a FRAND commitment under an 
estoppel theory, an implementer need only show the patent holder made a promise, 
the patent holder intended it to be relied upon, and the implementer did, in fact, 
justifiably and detrimentally rely on that promise. 
 
2.  The Challenge of Actual Reliance 
 
The principal impediment to the application of promissory estoppel in the 
context of patent pledges is the requirement of actual reliance. A manufacturer that 
wishes to enforce a patent holder’s promise to grant a license must prove that it 
actually and justifiably relied on that specific promise. But actual reliance in such 
cases may be difficult to prove. Unlike buying a house or forbearing from collecting 
a debt, the actions that a manufacturer would take in reliance on a patent holder’s 
promise to grant a license (e.g., developing and releasing a new product) might 
coincide with actions that the manufacturer might have taken anyway. Moreover, a 
particular patent holder must tie actual reliance to a particular promise. For example, 
using the hypothetical developed in Part II.B.1 above, patent holder Paul and ten 
other firms hold patents essential to 3DPP’s I-123 standard. They have all made 
FRAND commitments to 3DPP. Manufacturer Mary, knowing that the members of 
the 3DPP group are subject to FRAND commitments, decides to release a new 3D 
printer cartridge that complies with the I-123 standard. Now suppose that Paul 
reneges on his commitment to grant a license to Mary on FRAND terms. How can 
Mary show that she has relied specifically on Paul’s commitment?172 Must Mary 
materially change her course of conduct by delaying the release of her product in 
order to demonstrate reliance and to enforce Paul’s promise? Or must she show that 
she was specifically aware of Paul’s patents that are essential to standard I-123? In 
complex markets characterized by thousands of patents and dozens of patent holders, 
demonstrating specific reliance is challenging. 
Another difficulty in applying promissory estoppel to patent pledges arises with 
the identity of the person to whom the promise is made: the promisee. Specifically, 
only the promisee may seek to enforce a promise under a promissory estoppel 
theory. In the case of FRAND commitments, the direct promisee is typically the 
SDO. Although it has been postulated, the third-party beneficiary doctrine has not 
                                                     
other members of VESA who relied on that certification. Id. at 629–30 (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, 
dissenting). The Commission, however, reasoned that “limiting the order solely to those 
companies that relied on Dell’s certification might not fully protect the competitive process 
or consumers” and adopted a broader remedy by prohibiting Dell from asserting its patents 
against any implementer of the VL-bus standard. Id. at 625 n.5 (majority opinion).  
172 For a discussion of why product manufacturers may (and often do) proceed with 
commercial product releases prior to obtaining patent licenses from all holders of standards-
essential patents, see Contreras, supra note 4, at 48–53. 
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been widely recognized in the context of promissory estoppel. 173  Thus, if a 
manufacturer is not the direct recipient of the patent holder’s promise (as is typically 
the case), it may face further difficulty in enforcing that promise.174 
Some SDOs, recognizing the value of promissory estoppel to potential 
implementers of their standards, have attempted to create policy workarounds to 
overcome obstacles to estoppel claims. For example, IEEE includes the following 
text in its standard LOA form: “By signing this Letter of Assurance, you . . . 
acknowledge that users and implementers of the [Proposed] IEEE Standard 
identified . . . above are relying or will rely upon and may seek enforcement of the 
terms of this LOA.”175 
Such statements are intended to establish that the promisor (the patent holder) 
is aware that others are likely to rely on its FRAND commitment—a useful showing 
when making a case for detrimental reliance.176 Such statements may also support a 
promisee’s argument that its reliance on the patent holder’s commitment was 
reasonable and justifiable. But such statements do little to establish that the 
implementer did, in fact, rely on the patent holder’s specific promise. Thus, despite 
this well-intentioned policy language, the doctrine of promissory estoppel currently 
remains an imperfect solution for the enforcement of FRAND commitments and 
other patent pledges. 
 
3.  Efficient Placement of the Burden of Reliance 
 
Unlike a common law contract, a promise enforced by estoppel does not reflect 
a “meeting of the minds” by the parties. As such, one party is likely to be 
disadvantaged, or at least placed in a situation that he or she did not wish to be 
placed, by the enforcement of the promise. As Professor Avery Katz observes, such 
a result is consistent with a view of promissory estoppel as a “regulatory” 
mechanism, one that operates to achieve socially beneficial normative outcomes, 
                                                     
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. c (1981) (“If a promise is made 
to one party for the benefit of another, it is often foreseeable that the beneficiary will rely on 
the promise. Enforcement of the promise in such cases rests on the same basis and depends 
on the same factors as in cases of reliance by the promisee.”). 
174 Of course, the definition of “promisee” may be somewhat flexible. If a patent holder 
makes a declaration to an SDO that it will license its patents on FRAND terms, it may be 
possible to construe the other members of the SDO as recipients of that promise, in addition 
to the SDO entity itself. As noted by one commentator, however, “[t]hird parties who did not 
participate in the standards-setting activity and had no contact with the patentee would be 
unable to establish detrimental reliance.” Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the 
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 659 (2002) (discussing patent 
equitable estoppel rather than promissory estoppel). But see Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915 
(arguing that both members and nonmembers of an SDO should be entitled to rely on a 
promissory estoppel theory to enforce provisions of an SDO’s IP policy). 
175 IEEE LOA, supra note 64, § G. 
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981) (“The promisor is 
affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee . . . .”). 
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rather than merely to reflect the intentions of the affected parties.177 In the case of 
promissory estoppel, Katz measures social benefit in terms of efficiency.178 He 
concludes that it is efficient to enforce a precontractual promise only if the promisor 
would have greater bargaining power than the promisee after making the promise.179 
 
The reasoning underlying this conclusion is straightforward. Economic 
efficiency requires that the benefits of reliance and the risk that it will be 
wasted be balanced against each other at the margin. The level of reliance 
that is privately profitable for the parties will coincide with the socially 
optimal level under two conditions: The person who controls the reliance 
must enjoy its marginal benefits, and he or she must also pay the costs 
when it is wasted. Since in preliminary negotiations both parties control 
the reliance and the party with the ex post bargaining power gets the gains, 
it is that party who should also bear the costs.180 
 
Katz’s reasoning, which he developed from case law relating to precontractual 
construction disputes, is extensible to patent pledges. When a pledge, particularly a 
FRAND commitment in the standards context, is made, it is likely to induce the 
promisee to incur substantial development, marketing, training, and other costs (i.e., 
lock-in).181 Thus, it is reasonable to enforce the pledge against the patent holder, as 
the patent holder will likely have substantially greater bargaining power after the 
potential licensee has made investments and become locked-in on the basis of that 
promise.182 
 
4.  Promissory Versus Equitable Estoppel 
 
Promissory estoppel should not be confused with the related but distinct 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in patent cases. Both equitable estoppel and 
promissory estoppel may be invoked when a patent holder represents in some way 
that it will not enforce a patent against an infringer.183 However, while promissory 
estoppel is based on a promise made by the patent holder, equitable estoppel 
typically involves deceptive conduct of some other kind, such as a long period of 
                                                     
177 Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel 
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1253 (1996). 
178 Id. at 1254 (stating that “reliance is reasonable when its expected benefits exceed its 
expected costs—as in Learned Hand’s celebrated formula for determining negligence 
liability in tort” (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947)). 
179 Id. at 1257. 
180 Id. 
181 See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
182 Id. 
183 See 6A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05, at 19-542 (2014).  
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silence implying the patent holder’s assent to a potentially infringing activity.184 As 
explained by the Michigan Supreme Court, “Equitable estoppel is essentially a 
doctrine of waiver. . . . Promissory estoppel, in contrast[,] . . . substitutes for 
consideration in a case where there are no mutual promises . . . .”185 
There is admittedly a place for equitable estoppel in policing private behavior 
in the standards-setting context. Professor Henry E. Smith describes equitable 
estoppel as a viable “anti-opportunism safety valve” for standard setting, noting that 
it has the advantage of offering recourse to nonmembers of SDOs, as well as 
members.186 The doctrine was successfully invoked as a defense in Broadcom Corp. 
v. Qualcomm Inc.,187 a case in which the patent holder allegedly deceived an SDO 
by withholding information in violation of SDO rules.188 
Likewise, Professor Robert P. Merges and Jeffrey M. Kuhn, seeking to address 
cases of deceptive conduct in standard setting, propose that standards implementers 
accrue a reliance interest in their continued use of standardized technologies not 
through promise (as this Article proposes), but through use.189 Their doctrine of 
“standards estoppel” provides that once a standardized technology becomes broadly 
adopted in the market, implementers gain immunity from patent infringement, 
whether SDO participants or nonparticipants hold patents, and whether or not they 
have expressed any willingness to license these patents.190 
While this proposed doctrine is appealing, at a practical level it would expand 
the estoppel defense to patents held by third parties who are not part of the standards-
development process. Such a proposal would enable opportunistic SDO participants 
to draft standards to intentionally embody technologies claimed by nonparticipants’ 
patents.191 Nonparticipants, not being part of the standards-development process, 
would have no ability to negotiate with SDO participants to withdraw their patented 
                                                     
184 See, e.g., Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1126–32 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the patentee’s misleading silence for four and a half years following the initial 
demand letter estopped the patentee from asserting its patent against alleged infringer). 
185 Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640, 647 (Mich. 1977). 
186 Smith, supra note 151, at 1086. 
187 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).  
188 See id. at 303. Rambus also contemplated the possibility of equitable estoppel in 
deciding on a course of action prior to its participation in various lawsuits with respect to its 
involvement in the JEDEC SDO. See Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *38, 
44 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d sub nom. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). But see George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup 
Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 939 (2011) (observing that both 
“reliance” and “material prejudice” elements of equitable estoppel may be difficult to prove 
in the standards context). 
189 Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).  
190 Id. 
191 This tactic of deliberately incorporating a third party’s patented technology into a 
standard has been referred to as “guerilla standardization.” See Lerner & Tirole, supra note 
4, at 24–26. 
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technologies from the standard, and the simple use of this technology by a sufficient 
number of implementers, against the will of the patent holder, could result in the 
estoppel of any infringement claim. As such, the Merges-Kuhn proposal could allow 
SDO participants to appropriate the patented technology of nonparticipants in a 
standard without their acquiescence (or even knowledge) and would thus unduly tilt 
the playing field in favor of standards implementers. 
Suffice it to say that if market participants and courts are going to accept a 
proposal for the general enforcement of patent pledges, the proposal must be fair 
both to patent holders and standards implementers. But even if “standards estoppel” 
as proposed by Merges and Kuhn were otherwise viable, both it and other forms of 
equitable estoppel are based on deception, making them less useful in the many cases 
in which patent pledges are sought to be enforced but deceptive conduct does not 
occur.192 For this reason, equitable estoppel is not an ideal theoretical framework for 
the general enforcement of patent pledges. 
 
C.  Antitrust 
 
Antitrust law has also been proposed as a means for enforcing patent pledges. 
Enforcement agencies in both the United States and European Union have recently 
indicated a willingness to prosecute potential breaches of patent pledges using the 
tools of antitrust and competition law. 193  Numerous commentators have also 
advocated the use of antitrust remedies and enforcement as a means for policing 
compliance with standards-related commitments.194 But, as discussed below, claims 
under antitrust and competition law often require the demonstration of antitrust harm 
and exclusionary conduct, which may not always be present when seeking to enforce 
patent pledges. 
 
                                                     
192 Cf. infra Part III.C.1 (discussing limitations of deception-based antitrust theories). 
193 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120, 
at 3 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Google F.T.C. Statement], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolastmt
ofcomm.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9PFE-FQDC; Statement of the Federal Trade 
Commission, Robert Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081, at 3 (F.T.C. Nov. 26, 2012) 
[hereinafter Bosch F.T.C. Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cases/2012/11/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf, archived at http://perma. 
cc/S83K-TYY4. 
194 See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 97, at 315–22 (discussing whether parties have a right 
to seek enforcement of contractual obligations and whether the law of remedies can be 
applied to patent rights); Cary et al., supra note 188, at 921 (“[I]t is unsurprising that antitrust 
has long been applied to the conduct of standard-setting organizations. . . . Indeed, because 
the opportunistic conduct resulting in patent holdup specifically ‘concerns the inefficient 
acquisition of market power,’ many commentators have ‘generally assumed that [such] 
opportunism in the standard-setting process is an antitrust problem.’” (citations omitted)). 
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1.  Monopolization and Deception 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”195 To 
prevail on a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant had power in the relevant market and willfully sought, 
acquired, or maintained that power in an unlawful manner.196 The FTC may also 
bring claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization under Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).197 
The theory underlying monopolization claims in the context of patent pledges 
holds that standards, once adopted broadly in the marketplace, can confer market 
power on the holders of patents covering those standards.198 Abuse of such market 
power could constitute unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization.199 
Accordingly, some have argued that claims of monopolization may serve as 
effective means of ensuring that parties comply with their FRAND commitments.200  
                                                     
195 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
196 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (“It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power 
. . . .’” (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966))). 
197 15 U.S.C. § 45. The FTC may choose to bring an action for monopolization or 
attempted monopolization under either or both of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). The decision regarding which statutory 
provision to proceed under is largely a tactical one, and may depend on whether the 
Commission wishes to seek retrospective monetary damages available under the Sherman 
Act or prospective (injunctive) relief under the FTC Act. See Dell Computer Corp., 121 
F.T.C. 616, 626 (1996) (“[U]nlike other antitrust statutes, Section 5 provides only for 
prospective relief. In fact, the judicious use of Section 5—culminating in carefully tailored 
relief—is particularly appropriate in this type of case, in which the legal and economic 
theories are somewhat novel.”); Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 2–3 (“A stand-
alone Section 5 unfair methods of competition claim allows the Commission to protect 
consumers and the standard-setting process while minimizing the often burdensome 
combination of class actions and treble damages associated with private antitrust 
enforcement.”); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive 
Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 469, 495 (2009) (arguing that the FTC may have brought action under Section 5 
rather than Section 2 due to the difficulty of meeting more stringent Section 2 liability 
standards or a desire to achieve a broad reading of Section 5). 
198 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON 
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 115–17 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ABA 
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK] (discussing cases in which federal courts have addressed “whether 
a monopolist’s refusal to license intellectual property may provide a basis for a 
monopolization claim”). 
199 Id. 
200  See, e.g., Hesse, supra note 28, at 19 (asking rhetorically, “Is it potentially a 
violation of Section 2 when a F/RAND-encumbered SEP owner exercises the monopoly 
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Most actions for monopolization in the standards context have involved claims 
that the patent holder deceived either an SDO or other SDO participants regarding 
its patents. As explained by the FTC, “Exclusionary conduct such as deception may 
distort the selection of technologies and evade protections designed by [SDOs] to 
constrain the exercise of monopoly power, with substantial and lasting harm to 
competition.”201  
This theory received at least some support from the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., which reasoned that a patent 
holder’s intentionally false promise to license standards-essential patents on 
FRAND terms could violate Section 2.202 Such deception, the court noted, “harms 
the competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology 
in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly 
power on the patent holder.”203 Despite the specter of such liability, however, the 
court in Broadcom found that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for 
monopolization (as it did not yet compete in the relevant market), and that it failed 
to allege an antitrust injury.204 Thus, the court did not ultimately apply the Sherman 
Act to the alleged misconduct. 
The FTC has also brought monopolization claims based on deceptive conduct 
within an SDO. These cases have included actions against Dell,205 Rambus,206 and 
Unocal, 207  each of which involved charges that the patent holder deceptively 
withheld information regarding patents essential to the practice of a standard and 
later sought to collect royalties under those patents.208 In each case, this deception 
was claimed to constitute exclusionary conduct giving rise to a claim for 
                                                     
power that he or she acquired through participation in the standard-setting process in breach 
of the SEP owner’s F/RAND commitment?”); ABA ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 198, 
at 87–93 (“Courts have long held that a firm may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act by 
using monopoly power in one market to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the market.”); 
George S. Cary et al., Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1241, 1244–54 (2008) (noting cases that address monopolization claims to ensure 
FRAND commitments); Erica S. Mintzer & Logan M. Breed, How to Keep the Fox Out of 
the Henhouse: Monopolization in the Context of Standards-Setting Organizations, INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2007, at 1, 2–3 (discussing Rambus, the “first-of-its-kind ruling,” 
in which the FTC unanimously held the unlawful monopolization warranted imposing 
“liability on a single firm for subverting the standards-setting process”). 
201 See Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *18 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d 
sub nom. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
202 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 303. 
205 Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). 
206 Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117.  
207 Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), 138 F.T.C. 1 (2004). 
208 See Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 618, 624–25; Unocal, 138 F.T.C. at 2; Rambus, 2006 WL 
2330117, at *2. 
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monopolization. 209  The FTC settled its cases against Dell and Unocal, in both 
instance entering a consent order effectively rendering the asserted patents 
unenforceable.210 In Rambus, Inc.,211 however, the FTC found Rambus liable for 
violation of Section 5, based on an underlying violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.212 In analyzing the element of deception constituting Rambus’s exclusionary 
conduct, the FTC relied on its 1983 policy statement on deception, which requires a 
“misrepresentation, omission, or other practice” that was likely to mislead others 
acting reasonably under the circumstances.213 The FTC concluded that Rambus 
engaged in such deception, and when combined with the resulting harm to 
competition, found Rambus liable for monopolization.214 
While monopolization and attempted monopolization are powerful legal 
claims, they do not seem well suited as general means for policing FRAND 
commitments and other patent pledges. First, under the formulation stated by the 
Third Circuit, a deception of some kind must be shown to make a claim of 
monopolization.215 For example, to avoid triggering the FRAND commitment, the 
patent holder must know that it holds patents subject to a FRAND commitment and 
then conceal them from the SDO and its other participants. This conduct has been 
termed patent “ambush,” and is generally viewed as deserving of sanction. 216 
However, patent ambush does not appear to be common, or even the focus of most 
litigation over FRAND commitments today.217  Claims of monopolization seem 
inapplicable to cases of genuine disagreement by parties over the scope of FRAND 
                                                     
209 See Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 629–32 (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, dissenting); Unocal, 138 
F.T.C. at 92; Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117, at *2.  
210 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges (Nov. 2, 
1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/11/dell-computer-
settles-ftc-charges, archived at http://perma.cc/JFR4-83C2; Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Announced Action for August 2, 2005 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/08/announced-action-august-2-2005, 
archived at http://perma.cc/87EP-XGGS. 
211 Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d sub nom. 
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
212 Id. at *2. 
213  FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 14, 1983), 
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4LMY-W4AX. 
214 Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117, at *2. 
215 But see Hesse, supra note 28, at 21 (noting that some commentators have suggested 
that a monopolization claim under Section 2 may not in fact require deception during the 
standardization process). 
216 See Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to 
Adoption of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV. 644, 648–50 (2003); Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent 
Holdup in Standards Development: Life After Rambus v. F.T.C., ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, 
at 26, 26 n.2. 
217 See Contreras, supra note 4, app. (cataloging U.S. FRAND litigation through 2012). 
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commitments and cases in which patents have been disclosed (i.e., not concealed), 
yet the parties have otherwise failed to enter into a license agreement. 
Second, as the D.C. Circuit held in Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 218  even when 
deceptive conduct is present, it “must have an anticompetitive effect in order to form 
the basis of a monopolization claim.”219 In overturning the FTC’s holding, the court 
explained that deception “simply to obtain higher prices normally has no particular 
tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.”220 Accordingly, the 
court held the Commission failed to establish that Rambus unlawfully monopolized 
the relevant markets.221 
Given the difficulty of establishing a claim for monopolization and the potential 
lack of deception in many cases, it seems unlikely that an antitrust monopolization 
theory will prove to be useful as a general legal theory for enforcing parties’ patent 
pledges.222 This being said, in some cases a patent holder’s deceptive or otherwise 
abusive conduct should continue to be actionable as monopolization or attempted 
monopolization. 
 
2.  Exclusion and Essential Facilities 
 
Another approach that has been suggested to enforce patent pledges under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is to characterize a patent holder’s failure to grant (or 
offer) an appropriate license, or its attempt to enjoin a manufacturer from using a 
standardized technology, as a unilateral refusal to deal. Such refusals can give rise 
to liability under Section 2 if they are intended to create or maintain a monopoly or 
                                                     
218 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
219 Id. at 464. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 467. The D.C. Circuit decision in Rambus has been controversial and the 
subject of substantial debate. See, e.g., Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and 
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1479, 1480–82, 1518 (2010) (discussing the D.C. 
Circuit’s two fundamental errors in deciding Rambus); Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. 
in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up 
Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 661–62 (2009) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Rambus is inconsistent with precedent); Richard Wolfram, Commentary, 
“Analyze This!” Deconstructing Rambus Following the Supreme Court’s Denial of 
Certiorari—The Mechanics of How the D.C. Circuit’s Decision ‘Jumped the Tracks,’ AM. 
ANTITRUST INST. 5 (2009), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Rambus%20-
%20Analyze%20This%20-%20Deconstructing%20Rambus%20-%20AAI%20Comment 
ary_042720092020.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/838T-EQGL (explaining that the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Rambus was inconsistent and erroneous); Joshua D. Wright, Why the 
Supreme Court Was Correct to Deny Certiorari in F.T.C. v. Rambus 1 (Geo. Mason Univ. 
L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-14), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349969, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5NZ3-D2R2. 
222 See Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 216, at 31. 
528 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
withhold access to an “essential facility.” 223  A limited number of cases have 
considered whether the actions of an SDO can constitute exclusionary practices. In 
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc.,224 the First Circuit held that an 
SDO’s exclusion of a small security software vendor’s technology from the UNIX 
operating system did not violate the Sherman Act, as adequate technological grounds 
existed to prefer an alternative security technology.225  
As Professor Tom Cotter observes, refusal to deal claims, both generally and 
relating to essential facilities, have become increasingly difficult given courts’ 
generally expansive view of patent holders’ right to exploit their assets in the manner 
they select. 226  Thus, in addition to demonstrating that a patent holder seeks to 
exclude a competitor through its conduct, it must show that “the defendant intended 
to engage in predatory—and not merely competitive—behavior.”227 In the context 
of patent pledges, this is a high burden of proof. In fact, even in Broadcom, in which 
the court found that Qualcomm had engaged in exclusionary conduct in violation of 
Section 2, the court refrained from applying the refusal to deal doctrine. 228 
Accordingly, monopolization claims based on refusals to deal in the context of 
patent pledges, while possibly effective in a limited number of cases, are unlikely to 
form a consistent and reliable basis for the enforcement of patent pledges. 
                                                     
223 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 709 (3d ed. 2008); 2 JULIAN O. VON 
KALINOWSKI, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 25.04(3)(a) (2d ed. 2014). 
Such claims are based on the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(holding that possession of monopoly power combined with anticompetitive conduct may 
violate the Sherman Act); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition 
Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 532 (2013) (arguing that “anticompetitive exclusion, like 
anticompetitive collusion, must be understood as a core concern of competition policy”). 
224 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998). 
225 Id. at 49. A similar claim was brought against several SDOs and SDO participants 
in TruePosition Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
226 Cotter, supra note 97, at 332–34; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (“No patent 
owner otherwise entitled to relief . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license or use any 
rights to the patent . . . .”); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(providing that the patentee’s refusal to license technology “is expressly permitted by the 
patent laws” because “[t]he heart of (the patentee’s) legal monopoly is the right to invoke 
the State’s power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent” (quoting 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)).  
227 MiniFrame Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11 Civ. 7419 (RJS), 2013 WL 1385704, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013), aff’d, 551 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
223 (2014). 
228 501 F.3d 297, 316–17 (3rd Cir. 2007); Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Deception in 
Standard Setting: The Case for Antitrust Policy 26 (July 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A647-TTKT (“The court also rejected the complaint of the defendant and 
some amici that the complaint was of refusal to deal by another name . . . .”). 
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3.  Unfair Methods of Competition 
 
In addition to the enforcement authority described above, the FTC has authority 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prosecute “unfair methods of competition” and 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 229  While monopolization and attempted 
monopolization are actionable under Section 5, Section 5 also encompasses conduct 
beyond monopolization.230 In the standards context, it is possible that breaches of a 
patent holder’s FRAND commitments may themselves constitute unfair methods of 
competition or unfair acts and practices actionable under Section 5, even without 
deception. 
In 2008, the FTC brought a Section 5 action against Negotiated Data Solutions 
(N-Data) in connection with a patent reading on IEEE’s 802.3 Fast Ethernet 
standard.231 In 1994, the patent’s original owner, National Semiconductor, pledged 
to IEEE that it would license the patent for a flat fee of $1,000 to any party 
implementing the standard.232 National Semiconductor eventually transferred the 
patents to Vertical Networks, which then transferred the patents to N-Data, which 
allegedly indicated that it did not intend to honor National’s original $1,000 
licensing offer.233 The FTC, in bringing an action under Section 5, argued that N-
Data’s disavowal of National’s earlier patent pledge constituted an unfair method of 
competition, as well as an unfair act or practice.234 The case was resolved through a 
consent order in which N-Data agreed to honor National’s original patent pledge.235 
Nevertheless, Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, who dissented from the decision, 
observed that, unlike Dell, Unocal, and Rambus, N-Data did not appear to have 
engaged in deceptive conduct, and the Commission’s reliance on Section 5 may have 
inappropriately expanded the reach of Section 5.236  
The FTC renewed its use of Section 5 to address suspected violations of 
FRAND commitments in 2012 and 2013, when it initiated investigations of both 
                                                     
229 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
230 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the 
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930–
32, 934–37 (2010) (“Congress intended Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S. 
system of competition law by permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily 
proscribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 1890 Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act.”). 
231 Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1–5 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 22, 2008). 
232 See id. at *2. 
233 See id. at *4–5. 
234 See id. at *1. 
235 See id. at *6, *9.  
236 See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308, at *25–28 
(F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008) (Majoras, Chairman, dissenting).  
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Robert Bosch GmbH 237  and Motorola Mobility/Google. 238  Both cases involved 
allegations that patent holders improperly used FRAND-committed patents to seek 
injunctive relief against potential vendors of standardized products.239 According to 
the FTC’s complaint in Robert Bosch GmbH,240 SPX, a firm that Bosch sought to 
acquire, had participated in an SDO developing standards for automotive cooling 
systems.241 Despite having made a FRAND commitment to an SDO, SPX asserted 
two patents covering the SDO’s standards against alleged infringers and then sought 
injunctive relief to prevent future sales of infringing products.242 The FTC argued 
                                                     
237 See Bosch F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 1–3. For a more in-depth analysis 
of this case and its antitrust implications, see Cotter, supra note 97, at 327–29. 
238 See Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 1–5. 
239 The propriety of seeking injunctive relief in the face of FRAND commitments 
implicates other legal issues as well, including the application of the “public interest” test 
under Section 337 of the International Trade Commission Act and the Supreme Court’s four-
part eBay test for injunctive relief. See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42705, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT 
HOLDERS 9–20 (2012); U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY 
F/RAND COMMITMENTS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
290994.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3CX-CM8Z; Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. 
Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14, 20 
(2012); Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies 
Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 904–910 (2011); Colleen V. Chien et al., RAND Patents and 
Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International 
Trade Commission (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 07-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21 
02865, archived at http://perma.cc/QPG4-73AE. This issue has prompted both congressional 
hearings, see International Trade Commission and Patent Disputes: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012); Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American 
Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), and 
a presidential order, see Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: White House Task 
Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-
high-tech-patent-issues, archived at http://perma.cc/HBS2-ZZHB. Such conduct has also 
prompted investigations by the European Commission Directorate General for Competition 
under applicable provisions of EU competition law. Commission Decision (EC) No. 
COMP/M.6381 of Feb. 13, 2012, art. 6(1)(b), 2012 O.J. (C 75) 1 [hereinafter EC 
Google/Motorola Mobility Decision]; Press Release, European Comm’n, Samsung—
Enforcement of ETSI Standards Essential Patents (SEPs) (Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter EC 
Samsung Press Release], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-
1021_en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4RML-PFHD. 
240 Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013). 
241 See id. at 715–19 (2013). 
242 See id. at 718–19. 
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that SPX’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief in the face of its FRAND commitment 
was inherently coercive and oppressive, and thereby constituted an unfair method of 
competition in violation of Section 5.243 In an attempt, perhaps, to defuse Chairman 
Majoras’s criticism in Negotiated Data Solutions LLC244 regarding the expanding 
scope of Section 5,245 the FTC offered the caveat that “[w]hile not every breach of a 
FRAND licensing obligation will give rise to Section 5 concerns,” enforcement may 
be required “when such a breach tends to undermine the standard-setting process 
and risks harming American consumers . . . .”246 
The FTC again took action to address a patent holder’s attempt to obtain 
injunctive relief in the face of a prior FRAND commitment in Motorola Mobility 
LLC and Google, Inc.247 In that case, Motorola (later acquired by Google) held 
patents essential to practice standards promulgated by IEEE, ITU, and ETSI.248 
Motorola participated in, and made FRAND commitments to, each of these SDOs.249 
Nevertheless, in separate suits asserting these patents against Apple and Microsoft, 
Motorola sought exclusion orders at the ITC and injunctions in federal court to 
prevent future sales of standards-compliant products, even though both defendants 
were allegedly willing to acquire licenses to Motorola’s patents.250 The FTC asserted 
that Motorola’s attempt to enjoin sales of Apple and Microsoft products using its 
standards-essential patents constituted an unfair method of competition in violation 
of Section 5.251 As in Bosch, the Commission’s decision finding a violation of 
                                                     
243 However, the FTC also acknowledged that SPX’s conduct likely did not violate 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 833 n.7. 
244 Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308 (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 
2008). 
245 Id. at *25–28. 
246  Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. at 835. Despite this caveat, Commissioners 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen and J. Thomas Rosch nevertheless dissented from the Commission’s 
decision regarding injunctive relief. See id. at 835–36 (Ohlhausen, Comm’r, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Simply seeking injunctive relief on a patent subject to a fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) license, without more, even if seeking such 
relief could be construed as a breach of a licensing commitment, should not be deemed either 
an unfair method of competition or an unfair act or practice under Section 5.” (citations 
omitted)). 
247 Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 124100 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013). 
248 Id. at *2. 
249 Id. at *4. 
250 Id. 
251 Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 2–3. The FTC’s original complaint also 
asserted that Motorola’s conduct constituted an unfair or deceptive act, see id. at *5, but this 
allegation was dropped when the final order was adopted. Letter from Donald S. Clark, 
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Commenters 2 n.2 (July 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolalette
r.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D7S9-6P8K. 
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Section 5 in Motorola/Google was split 3 to 2.252 The dispute was settled after 
Google agreed not to seek injunctive relief with regard to standards-essential patents 
unless and until it complied with a series of procedural steps intended to facilitate 
agreement with prospective licensees regarding FRAND terms and conditions.253 
Despite the FTC’s invocation of Section 5 to condemn nondeceptive breaches 
of FRAND commitments in N-Data, Bosch, and Motorola/Google, it is not clear 
that Section 5 offers an optimal general theory for enforcing patent pledges. First, 
the boundaries of Section 5 in actions that do not involve monopolization and 
deception are relatively unclear, and there is still significant disagreement both 
among commentators 254  and FTC commissioners themselves 255  regarding the 
appropriate extent of Section 5 liability. Relying on such an uncertain and judicially 
untested standard as the principal mechanism for enforcing patent pledges could 
make the enforcement of such pledges less predictable and thus diminish their value 
as market-wide assurances.256 Second, even if the parameters of Section 5 were 
clarified to cover breaches of patent pledges with greater reliability, an action under 
                                                     
252 Commissioner Ohlhausen dissented with respect to both the unfair methods of 
competition and unfair acts and practices analyses. Motorola Mobility, 2013 WL 124100, at 
*26–27 (Ohlhausen, Comm’r, dissenting). Commissioner Rosch disagreed with the majority 
on the unfair methods of competition analysis. Id. at *29–31 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting). 
Professor Cotter offers a cogent analysis of the likely disposition of the commission 
following a series of personnel changes in mid-2013. See Cotter, supra note 97, at 331–32.  
253 Id. at *11–15 (majority opinion). 
254 In favor of a broad use of antitrust enforcement to address FRAND breaches, see, 
for example, Cary et al., supra note 188, at 943 (“[I]t is fair to ask why antitrust law should 
not reach opportunism, whether it was the patent holder’s intent all along or whether it 
occurred to the patent holder only after the standard was adopted.”); Farrell et al., supra note 
35, at 605–06 (arguing that “similar economic logic underlies some cases where patents were 
disclosed but users assert that the patent holder is not meeting its duty to license in a 
reasonable fashion” in the context of alleged violations of FRAND commitments). And for 
a skeptical look at the broad use of antitrust to address such claims, see, for example, Cotter, 
supra note 97, at 332 (“[T]he role of U.S. antitrust law as a means for enforcing FRAND 
commitments seems quite limited.”); Dagen, supra note 221, at 1503 (“Many believe that 
the interpretation of Section 5 as broader than the Sherman Act is a remnant of a bygone 
era.”); Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 197, at 495 (calling a broad expansion of Section 5 
liability “unsound antitrust policy”). 
255 See supra note 193; see also Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act 2–5 (June 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2013/06/statement-commissioner-joshua-d-wright, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4CSW-X8AL (supporting a relatively narrow interpretation of 
“unfair methods of competition”). 
256 One need only recall the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of the FTC’s decision in Rambus 
for a stark reminder that, while U.S. enforcement agencies may have theories regarding the 
scope and applicability of the law, such agencies do not make the law, and their actions are 
ultimately subject to review by the courts. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 468–69 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Section 5 can be brought by only the FTC in its enforcement capacity, and not by 
private litigants. Thus, such actions depend on the enforcement priorities and 
resources of the FTC and as such cannot provide a reliable means for enforcing 
patent pledges across the board. 
 
4.  Antitrust Approaches, Generally 
 
Beyond the technical considerations discussed above, several commentators 
have raised policy-oriented concerns regarding the use of antitrust theories, in 
general, to enforce FRAND commitments and other patent pledges. To a significant 
degree, this debate mirrors the larger debate within the antitrust community 
regarding the advisability of weak versus strong antitrust enforcement in the area of 
intellectual property. 257  Professor David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, for 
example, argue that greater (and presumably unpredictable) intervention by antitrust 
enforcement authorities could erode patent holder confidence and willingness to 
participate in standards-development activities.258 The net result of such decreases 
in participation they argue would be an overall decline in innovation. George S. Cary 
and coauthors have criticized this position, finding little evidence supporting the 
specter of declining SDO participation resulting from greater antitrust 
enforcement.259 
More importantly, Professors Bruce H. Kobayashi and Joshua D. Wright260 
have argued that antitrust remedies should be avoided when private legal remedies 
                                                     
257 See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation 
and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 931 (2010) (“Antitrust law should stand aside when a 
government agency is an active regulator, but not when economic decision making is left 
entirely in private hands. As a result, antitrust rightfully has a place when the anticompetitive 
conduct occurs subsequent to patent issuance.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and 
Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 750 
(2011) (“[W]here intellectual property law leaves questions open, antitrust policy should feel 
free to seek the most competitive outcomes as long as they do not frustrate the underlying 
regulatory regime.”); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, The Limits of Antitrust and 
Patent Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al., 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 506 n.4 (2012) (providing 
additional relevant sources into the relationship between intellectual property law and 
antitrust law). 
258 David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 1913, 1986 (2003). 
259  Cary et al., supra note 188, at 923–24. I too am skeptical of predictions that 
participation in SDOs will decline because of greater constraints on potentially opportunistic 
behavior. Cf. Contreras, supra note 80, at 204–10 (finding little evidence of adverse effects 
on SDOs implementing requirements for greater disclosure of patent royalty rates). 
260 Wright was subsequently appointed as a commissioner of the FTC. Commissioners, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T7XY-8TQ5 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
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(such as contract and tort law) are available to redress the relevant harms.261 They 
reason first that antitrust law offers “little marginal benefit” over other legal regimes, 
and that the application of antitrust law to alleged instances of patent hold-up will 
thus yield inappropriate “false positives” (i.e., condemnation of behavior that does 
not otherwise give rise to liability).262 They further argue that the Supreme Court in 
a number of related areas has discouraged the use of antitrust law when such 
conditions are met.263 Cary and coauthors have critiqued Professors Kobayashi and 
Wright’s position, both with respect to their analysis of Supreme Court precedent264 
as well as their contention that antitrust offers little benefit beyond existing legal 
remedies.265 To this last point, Cary argues, consistently with Parts III.A and III.B 
of this Article, that doctrines such as contract, estoppel, and tort are probably 
available only to parties having a direct relationship with the patent holder or SDO, 
and offer little recourse to third-party consumers who may be harmed by a patent 
holder’s failure to abide by its commitments.266 While Cary looks to antitrust law to 
fill the gap left by these other legal doctrines, the market reliance theory proposed 
in this Article offers a viable alternative without implicating the enforcement 
concerns raised by Professors Kobayashi and Wright.267 
 
D.  Patent Misuse 
 
Some commentators, notably Professor Daryl Lim, have suggested that 
violations of FRAND commitments and other misconduct in the standard-setting 
                                                     
261 See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 197, at 506–16 (discussing the comparative 
advantage of tort and contract law in regulating breach of FRAND commitments). 
262 Id. at 486. 
263 See id. at 472–86 (going so far as to refer to these cases as resulting in the implied 
preemption of antitrust law by state liability doctrines in such cases). 
264 See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 925–37. But see Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 
257, at 508–21 (responding to criticisms). 
265 See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 937–44; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent 
Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1197 (2009) 
(criticizing Kobayashi and Wright’s “false positive” analysis). But see Kobayashi & Wright, 
supra note 257, at 521–26 (responding to criticisms). 
266 See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 937–44. 
267 While Professors Kobayashi and Wright speak to the virtues of contract law as a 
mechanism for enforcing patent-related commitments and addressing patent holdup, 
Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 257, at 523–26, their position does not speak exclusively 
to common law contract doctrine as I have outlined it in Part III.A above. And while 
Professors Kobayashi and Wright describe various benefits afforded by “contract” doctrine, 
their analysis appears to encompass both common law contract and promissory estoppel 
under this general contract rubric. See id. at 524–26. Accordingly, I believe that the 
Kobayashi and Wright analysis would equally favor the application of the market reliance 
doctrine proposed in this Article. 
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context should be addressed under a patent misuse theory.268 Patent misuse is an 
equitable defense to a claim for patent infringement that excuses infringement upon 
a showing that the patent holder sought to exceed the scope of the patent grant.269 
Patent misuse doctrine finds roots in both antitrust and patent law270 and has been 
used to address conduct including the tying of a patent license to the purchase of 
unpatented articles, 271  the collection of royalties following the expiration of a 
patent’s term,272 and the collection of royalties on sales of unpatented articles.273 The 
consequences of a finding of misuse are severe and often result in a patent becoming 
unenforceable until the effects of the misuse have been sufficiently dissipated or 
“purged.”274 
Despite the potential of the patent misuse defense, its application to the 
enforcement of most patent pledges is not promising. Under current judicial 
interpretations, a finding of patent misuse requires that the patent holder attempted 
to exceed the bounds of the patent grant. Charging a royalty to license a valid, 
unexpired patent, even an unreasonably high one, is squarely within a patent holder’s 
statutory rights. In fact, the U.S. Patent Act goes even further and expressly provides 
that a patent holder’s complete refusal to license a patent will not constitute an act 
of patent misuse.275 Thus, it is difficult to see how a patent holder could be found to 
                                                     
268 See Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 
IDEA 559, 559–60 (2011); Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls and the 
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 86–90 (2014) 
[hereinafter Lim, Standard Essential Patents]. 
269 See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (stating that “any 
attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the 
patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter 
to the policy and purpose of the patent laws”); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34 
(1964) (“The exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired is an 
assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when, as we have seen, the patent 
has entered the public domain. . . . [A]n attempt to project it into another term by continuation 
of the licensing agreement is unenforceable.” (citations omitted)). 
270 See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476 
(2011) (referring to the patent misuse doctrine as “a schizophrenic doctrine that vacillates 
between IP and antitrust law”). 
271 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489–91 (1942). 
272 See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33–34. But see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 
U.S. 257, 265–66 (1979) (holding that an unsuccessful applicant for a patent may charge 
royalties indefinitely if a patent never issues); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (permitting postexpiration royalties as reflective of an economic bargain 
between parties). 
273 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) 
(holding that conditioning the license of one patent on the licensing of another and payment 
of royalties on unpatented articles constitute misuse). 
274 U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). 
275 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012) (“No patent owner . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of 
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license 
. . . any rights to the patent . . . .”). 
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commit patent misuse by charging a royalty that exceeds a promised “reasonable” 
rate, or enforcing a patent that it promised not to enforce. 
Lim argues that the doctrine of patent misuse should be expanded to provide a 
more general equitable tool for policing unfair and inequitable conduct using 
patents.276 Such a judicial expansion of the misuse doctrine may be warranted, 
though the breadth and potential subjectivity of such a doctrine would need to be 
taken carefully into account. But in any event, until such an expansion of the patent 
misuse doctrine occurs, it does not present itself as a likely candidate for the general 
enforcement of patent pledges. 
 
E.  Equitable Servitude 
 
Building on the work of Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith,277 
Professor Jay P. Kesan and Carol Hayes liken FRAND commitments to 
encumbrances on real property (i.e., equitable servitudes “running with the land”).278 
Professor Kesan and Hayes argue that FRAND commitments should be treated as 
servitudes appurtenant to the patents they encumber, and that such commitments 
should, in effect, “run with the patent.”279 They identify several areas in which this 
property-based characterization would yield benefits: FRAND commitments would 
more readily bind subsequent owners of pledged patents, FRAND commitments 
would be harder to avoid and negate in bankruptcy proceedings, and specific 
performance might be more readily available to enforce such commitments.280 
A property-based theory for enforcing patent pledges is attractive, as it could 
bind the affected patents themselves, in an in rem manner, rather than patent holders, 
which may be transient and subject to change. Professor Smith himself 
acknowledges the benefits of property-based theories when dealing with standards 
setting, though in a somewhat different context. 281  While a property-based 
characterization of FRAND commitments has benefits, it is not clear that such an 
approach is viable on a theoretical or practical level. At a theoretical level, Professor 
Kesan and Hayes acknowledge282 one of the primary difficulties in analogizing 
patent-related encumbrances to real property servitudes: patents are not real 
property; they are, at most, treated in some respects as personal property,283 and 
                                                     
276 Lim, Standard Essential Patents, supra note 268, at 89 (“The need to do justice 
allows courts to look beyond the form of a misuse to its effects.”). 
277  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776–811 (2001).  
278 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 285–86. 
279 Id. at 297–300. 
280 Id. at 296–300. 
281  Smith, supra note 163, at 16–17 (discussing property-like aspects of the 
standardization function itself, as implemented through the SDO). 
282 Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 286–87. 
283  35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (deeming patents to “have the attributes of personal 
property”). 
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servitudes on personal property are generally disfavored in the law.284 In arguing 
against this presumption, Professor Kesan and Hayes cite commentators who have 
recently urged an application of property-based rules to copyright licenses. 285 
However, FRAND commitments are not, themselves, intellectual property licenses, 
but merely promises to grant licenses, thus running into one of the same obstacles 
that impede common law contract theory in this area. 286  Moreover, Professor 
Christina M. Mulligan has argued that servitudes grounded in real property law 
should not be extended to personal property, in general, or intellectual property 
licenses, in particular, due to increased information costs associated with identifying 
and handling servitudes applicable to numerous, frequently transferred forms of 
property.287 
At a practical level, the equitable servitude approach might prove useful in 
describing FRAND commitments that are clearly delineated and attached to one or 
more identified patents, like easements recorded in the deeds of parcels of realty. 
But as illustrated by Table 1, most FRAND commitments are not so well specified. 
And a real property analogy is less likely to hold as to FRAND commitments that 
are made with respect to a patent holder’s portfolio in general, without reference to 
particular patents, or by means of implied commitments to abide by an SDO’s 
bylaws.288 Thus, the equitable servitude theory, even if theoretically viable, might 
                                                     
284 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 & n.68 (2000) (“American 
precedent is largely, if not quite exclusively, in accord” with the principle that “one cannot 
create servitudes in personal property”); Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2004). In fact, there is a large body of cases involving 
covenants relating to real property that have been deemed by the courts to be contractual in 
nature, rather than encumbrances affecting title to the property. See, e.g., Mountain Brow 
Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818–19 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding a covenant 
not to sell a property for use other than as a fraternal lodge acted as a condition subsequent 
rather than a restraint on alienation). 
285 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 285–88 (citing Christopher M. Newman, A 
License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law 
of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101 (2013); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The 
New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008)).  
286 See supra Part III.A. 
287 Christina M. Mulligan, The Cost of Personal Property Servitudes: Lessons for the 
Internet of Things 1 (July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465651, archived at http://perma.cc/R 
6PM-VDEA (theorizing that “greater flexibility in property interests is most beneficial when 
property is distinct, valuable, and rarely encountered” and arguing that “[i]n comparison, 
greater standardization is appropriate when property is fungible, lacks value, and is casually 
or frequently interacted with”). 
288 An analogy in the real property context might be a public announcement by the 
owner of a hotel chain that “room rates at our properties will always be fair and reasonable.” 
While consumers who allege that such rates are unreasonably high during the summer travel 
season may have actions in contract, promissory estoppel, and various consumer protection 
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only have limited applicability to a subset of FRAND commitments and even less 
to the broader realm of patent pledges.  
 
IV.  MARKET RELIANCE 
 
Part III identified deficiencies in current contract, promissory estoppel, 
antitrust, and other theories used to justify the enforcement of FRAND 
commitments. Part IV offers a new “market reliance” theory that looks to securities 
regulation and the doctrine of fraud-on-the-market to adapt the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel for the enforcement of FRAND commitments and other patent 
pledges.  
 
A.  Public Securities Law and “Fraud-on-the-Market” 
 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934,289 prohibits the making of untrue statements or omissions of material fact 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.290 Private litigants may invoke 
Rule 10b-5 when bringing claims against issuers of public securities, generally, 
when they incur trading losses resulting from such untrue statements or omissions 
(i.e., selling at an artificially low price or buying at an artificially high price). The 
basic elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim stem from the common law actions for 
fraud and deceit.291 To prevail on a common law fraud claim, the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant made a false statement or omission of material fact with 
the intent to induce the plaintiff’s action, and that the plaintiff justifiably relied on 
the statement to his or her detriment.292 Thus, like a claim for promissory estoppel, 
a claim for fraud requires reliance by the injured party. 
But unlike a traditional claim for fraud or for promissory estoppel, the injured 
party’s reliance in a Rule 10b-5 action may be presumed under a doctrine that has 
come to be known as fraud-on-the-market. Fraud-on-the-market is based on the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis, which posits that in an efficient securities 
market all available information, true or false, will be reflected rapidly in the price 
of a company’s stock. Thus, as soon as the company or one of its officers makes a 
false statement, the company’s stock price will either rise or fall based on the false 
information, and the plaintiff, so long as he or she purchased stock in the open 
market, need not demonstrate specific reliance on the statement in order to make a 
claim. 
                                                     
laws, it is hard to envision a scenario in which the properties themselves can be said to be 
burdened by an equitable servitude. 
289 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
290 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
291  See 7 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 426–55 (4th ed. 2012); 4 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.10[6][B] (6th 
ed. 2009). 
292 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 291, at 427.  
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The fraud-on-the-market theory is generally attributed to Professor Daniel R. 
Fischel at the University of Chicago, who promoted it as a means for securities 
plaintiffs to overcome the requirement that they demonstrate actual reliance on 
particular statements made by or about a company.293 Professor Fischel’s work 
began to be cited by federal district and circuit courts by the early 1980s,294 and in 
1988 the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson,295 a little over a decade after the theory’s emergence. 
In 1976, Basic Inc., a publicly traded chemical manufacturer, began merger 
discussions with Combustion Engineering. 296  During 1977 and 1978, however, 
Basic’s officers made a number of public announcements, including statements to 
the press and public securities filings, that denied any potential merger activity.297 A 
number of shareholders sold their shares of Basic stock during this period.298 Then, 
in December 1978, Basic announced the pending merger with Combustion, causing 
the price of its stock to rise.299 The shareholders who sold before the merger was 
announced sued the company for securities fraud, alleging that the prices at which 
they sold their shares would have been higher had Basic truthfully disclosed its 
ongoing merger discussions before they sold their shares.300 In other words, their 
returns were “artificially depressed” because of Basic’s misleading public 
statements denying the merger discussions.301 
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,302 ruled for the plaintiffs, adopting 
the fraud-on-the-market theory in the court’s reasoning. Specifically, he accepted 
the proposition that, in an efficient public securities market, all available information 
will be reflected in the price of a company’s stock.303 If a misleading statement 
                                                     
293  Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases 
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. L. 1, 9 (1982); see Barbara Black, Fraud on 
the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market 
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 437 n.7, 447–53 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient 
Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 
908–15 (1989). 
294 See Black, supra note 293, at 447–53 (tracing early judicial adoption of the fraud-
on-the-market theory). 
295 485 U.S. 224, 246–50 (1988). 
296 Id. at 227. 
297 Id. at 227–28.  
298 Id. at 228.  
299 Id. at 227–28. 
300 Id. at 228.  
301 Id. 
302 The majority in Basic consisted of only four justices: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, 
and Stevens. Id. at 225. Justices White and O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. 
Id. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of 
the case. Id.  
303  Id. at 244 (“In an open and developed market, the dissemination of material 
misrepresentations or withholding of material information typically affects the price of the 
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artificially causes the price of the stock to change, then every purchaser or seller of 
the stock at that “incorrect” price will be injured, whether or not aware of the 
misleading statement.304 Such misleading statements will thus “defraud purchasers 
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.”305 The 
holding in Basic thus creates a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied on the 
defendant’s misinformation, without actual proof of reliance.306 The fraud-on-the-
market doctrine established in Basic has been applied by numerous lower courts307 
and was reaffirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in 2014.308 
Judicially crafted presumptions such as the one adopted in Basic “typically 
serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one 
reason or another, is rendered difficult.”309 In the case of securities fraud, the Court 
                                                     
stock, and purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value.” 
(quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) ). 
304 See id. at 228, 242 (noting that Basic’s former shareholders “alleged that they were 
injured by selling Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by 
petitioners’ misleading statements and in reliance thereon”). 
305 Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).  
306 Id. at 250 (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by 
the fraud-on-the-market theory. . . . That presumption, however, is rebuttable.”). 
307 See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic . . . is widely 
credited with spawning a vast industry of securities fraud litigation . . . .”). 
308 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014). The 
efficient market hypothesis has come under recent attack by corporations seeking to limit 
shareholder class action suits. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), in which a six-justice majority upheld the doctrine, three dissenting 
justices called the decision in Basic “questionable.” Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
And Justice Alito, concurring in the decision, expressly suggested that “reconsideration of 
the Basic presumption may be appropriate.” Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring). In 
Halliburton, however, the Court upheld the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and the 
presumption of reliance in securities fraud cases, though it confirmed that a securities fraud 
defendant should have the opportunity to rebut the presumption of reliance by presenting 
evidence that the allegedly misleading statements had no impact on a security’s price. 134 
S. Ct. at 2402, 2404. 
In addition to attacks on the veracity of efficient markets hypothesis, the fraud-on-the-
market theory has been challenged as a matter of statutory interpretation. Professor Joseph 
Grundfest, in particular, has questioned the statutory underpinnings of the fraud-on-the-
market theory. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 309–19 (2014).  
But even if these challenges eventually result in a narrowing or reversal of the holding 
in Basic, they are particular to securities litigation and do not appear to have a significant 
impact on the general argument here—that a presumption of reliance is appropriate when a 
market is structured in such a way that reliance on commitments made to the market at large 
is both expected and necessary for its proper functioning. 
309 Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2008) (“[A]ffirmations of fact 
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description 
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in Basic concluded that it would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove that 
he specifically relied on particular misstatements when making a decision to 
purchase or sell a security.310 Given the normal efficient operation of the public 
securities markets, however, a plaintiff should be entitled to rely on the market price 
of a security as an accurate reflection of all public information concerning the issuer, 
and a plaintiff will be presumed to have done so absent a showing that he did not so 
rely (the rebuttable nature of the presumption).311 
In Basic, the Court acknowledged its deviation from the standards underpinning 
the traditional common law actions for fraud and deceit, which require a specific 
showing of detrimental reliance by the plaintiff.312 It justified this departure from 
precedent by pointing to the realities of modern securities markets “literally 
involving millions of shares changing hands daily” and emphasizing how today’s 
markets “differ from the face-to-face transactions” on which traditional fraud 
doctrine is based.313 The Court concluded that, as a matter of “fairness” and “public 
policy,” the law must evolve to accommodate this new market paradigm.314  
 
B.  A Market Reliance Theory for Patent Pledges 
 
1.  A Presumption of Reliance 
 
Like public statements made to influence securities markets, patent pledges 
have an inherently public audience. Though they may take many different forms 
(e.g., clauses in agreements, provisions of SDO bylaws, declarations posted on a 
web site, and subsequent clarifications of the same), all of these commitments are 
intended to assure the market that products complying with a standard or using a 
common technology platform may be manufactured and sold without the threat of 
patent litigation. This public assurance is essential to induce firms to invest capital 
                                                     
of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to 
weave them into the fabric of the agreement.”). 
310 Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (“Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts, 
i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed, or if the 
misrepresentation had not been made, would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary 
burden on the . . . plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” (citations omitted)). 
This burden of proof would effectively have made securities class actions impossible to 
bring. 
311  See id. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged 
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to 
trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”). For 
example, if a company cautions the public about the reliability of information that it has 
released—the “bespeaks caution” doctrine—the presumption of reasonable reliance may be 
overcome. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 92 (2d ed. 2006). 
312 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–50. 
313 Id. at 243–44. 
314 Id. at 245. 
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in standards-based technologies and thereby create positive network effects and 
enhance social welfare.315 
As this Article has shown, however, common law contract doctrine, rooted in 
notions of bilateral bargaining and the formal requirements of mutual assent and 
consideration, poorly models the diverse and public-facing character of FRAND 
commitments. Antitrust law, at best, may serve as a means for addressing cases 
involving deception by parties having some degree of market power. Promissory 
estoppel, which focuses on the promise made by a patent holder to the public, most 
accurately reflects the paradigm of patent pledges, but still requires a showing of 
specific, justifiable reliance on the part of the promisee. Were this reliance 
requirement relaxed, promissory estoppel could become an effective doctrinal tool 
for analyzing and enforcing these commitments. 
Accordingly, I propose a novel “market reliance” theory for the analysis of 
FRAND commitments and other patent pledges. Under this theory, patent pledges 
would be subject to a modified version of the promissory estoppel doctrine in which 
there is a rebuttable presumption of reliance. This rebuttable presumption arises 
from the promisor’s public statements regarding its commitments, as well as its 
participation in an industry-wide activity that yields significant welfare benefits. 
Following the reasoning of Basic and subsequent cases, a presumption of reliance is 
appropriate when a market is structured in such a way that reliance on commitments 
made to the market at large is both expected and necessary for its proper 
functioning. 316  Because technology markets are dependent on FRAND 
commitments and other patent pledges, this dependence is well-known to market 
participants (both patent holders and potential licensees), nearly all SDOs require or 
encourage FRAND licensing (at a minimum), and manufacturers of products 
including industry standards or other common technology platforms are justified in 
relying on the pledges that patent holders make covering such standards and 
platforms. These manufacturers are also justified in making investments on that 
basis. The justification for reliance echoes that described by the Court in Basic: “‘[I]t 
is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market 
integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?’”317 
Under the market reliance theory, it is unnecessary for a manufacturer who 
seeks to enforce a patent pledge to prove that it specifically relied on the pledge 
made by a specific patent holder. It is enough that the patent holder made such a 
commitment to the market, and that the manufacturer is or becomes a participant in 
that market by manufacturing or selling a product that uses a standard or other 
                                                     
315 See supra Part II.A. 
316 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 307, at 916–18, 931–32 (discussing the “market-based” 
approach embodied by cases following Basic and advantages of such an approach over 
traditional bilateral fraud determinations under the common law); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1757 (2013) 
(describing without adopting the view that “[f]raud-on-the-market claims are claims for a 
public or regulatory wrong, not a traditional tort or private wrong”). 
317 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 
535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).  
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common technology that is subject to patent pledges. Thus, like the rebuttable 
presumption of reliance in securities fraud cases, the law should recognize a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance in the enforcement of patent pledges based on 
market reliance. 
Returning to the illustration in Part II.D.1, manufacturer Mary may wish to 
release a 3D printer cartridge that complies with the I-123 standard. Mary knows 
that the members of 3DPP are subject to FRAND commitments, though she may not 
know specifically which 3DPP members hold which patents covering the I-123 
standard. Under the market reliance theory, Mary may develop and release an I-123-
compliant product relying on the fact that any 3DPP member holding patents 
covering the I-123 standard must grant her a license on FRAND terms. While there 
may still be disagreement over the meaning of such FRAND terms,318 particularly 
any associated Content Obligations, at least it is clear that Mary may compel Paul to 
honor his FRAND commitments, whatever they may be. And Paul cannot evade 
liability for compliance with arguments that Mary is not an intended third-party 
beneficiary of Paul’s commitment or that Mary has not proven specific reliance on 
Paul’s commitment. The fact that Mary is a participant in a market characterized by 
patent pledges and that Paul has made a pledge within the framework of that market 
is enough to allow Mary to rely on Paul’s patent pledge. Likewise, the fact that 
Paul’s pledge may not be specific enough to form a binding contract with Mary does 
not allow Paul to avoid complying with his promise to the greatest extent feasible. 
 
2.  Rebutting the Presumption 
 
In securities fraud cases, the presumption of reliance created under the fraud-
on-the-market theory can be rebutted by evidence that the plaintiff did not, in fact, 
rely on the false information disseminated to the market. As the Court explains in 
Basic, “Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and 
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair 
market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”319 For example, 
the presumption of reliance will be rebutted if a market maker with accurate 
knowledge of a company’s status determined the price at which the company’s stock 
traded, without regard to false information disseminated by the company; the false 
statements made by the company were corrected before the plaintiff transacted in 
the company’s stock; the false statement can be demonstrated to have had no impact 
on the price of the stock; or the plaintiff entered into a transaction for reasons 
independent of the market price (e.g., it was forced to sell due to political pressure 
or antitrust concerns).320 These circumstances would demonstrate that the plaintiff 
did not, or could not have, relied on the false statements made by the company in 
                                                     
318 For a discussion of the extensive debate over the meaning of FRAND, see supra 
note 22 and accompanying text. 
319 Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. 
320 Id. at 249. 
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deciding to enter into a stock transaction. On the other hand, merely showing that 
the plaintiff did not read an offering circular in which false information was 
distributed does not rebut the presumption of reliance, as the company’s false 
statements would still affect the market price of the stock.321 Plus, the plaintiff is 
presumed to have relied on the accuracy of the market price in conducting the 
transaction.322  
In the case of patent pledges, an implementer’s ability to enforce a pledge 
against a patent holder, and to sue for breach of that pledge, should also be subject 
to a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Evidence supporting rebuttal of the 
presumption might include (a) the implementer’s knowledge that the patent holder’s 
patents are not valid or not essential to a standard (thus eliminating the need for a 
license), (b) the patent holder’s abandonment of the patents (also eliminating the 
need for a license), (c) the implementer’s entering into a license with the patent 
holder (though a claim could still be brought if the implementer asserted that the 
terms of that license were not FRAND), (d) the implementer’s purchase of all 
necessary components implementing the standard from the patent holder’s existing 
licensees (thus exhausting the patent holder’s rights in those patents), or (e) the 
implementer’s unequivocal refusal to enter into good faith negotiations to obtain a 
FRAND license from the patent holder (demonstrating that the implementer did not 
rely on the patent holder’s promise to grant a FRAND license). Each of these cases 
would potentially “sever the link” between the patent holder’s breach of its FRAND 
commitment and the implementer’s failure to obtain a license under the patent 
holder’s standards-essential patents, thus justifying rebuttal of the presumption of 
reliance and, most likely, eliminating the implementer’s market reliance claim 
against the patent holder. 
 
3.  Which Promises to Enforce? 
 
Like both contract and promissory estoppel, the market reliance theory depends 
on the making of a promise by a patent holder. A promise embodying a patent pledge 
may be conveyed through a variety of different mechanisms, including an SDO 
membership agreement containing a pledge, an SDO’s bylaws or policies, a letter of 
assurance (LOA) submitted by a patent holder, or another form of public statement 
pledging some form of conduct with respect to one or more patents. Statements and 
conduct falling short of a promise, however, should not bind a patent holder under 
market reliance or other theories.323  
Thus, if an SDO’s policies are so ambiguous, indefinite, or incomplete that they 
do not reasonably convey a promise to the other participants or to the market in 
                                                     
321  See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 481 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J., 
dissenting). 
322 See id. at 468. 
323 See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 34–35) (“In order for a 
corporate pledge to be actionable, it should be of a type that would reasonably be assumed 
by the pledgor to induce action or forbearance in the pledgee.”). 
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general, then an action for market reliance should not succeed.324 This situation arose 
in a series of cases involving Rambus Inc., a technology developer that participated 
in the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), a voluntary SDO 
developing standards for computer memory chips. Though Rambus later withdrew 
from JEDEC and asserted its patents against manufacturers of devices using JEDEC 
standards, the Federal Circuit exonerated Rambus of liability, observing that the 
JEDEC policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left SDO 
participants with nothing but “vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe 
the policy requires.”325 
Likewise, a statement by a patent holder that should reasonably be construed as 
a nonbinding turn of phrase, marketplace exaggeration, or mere “puffery” should 
not be enforced as a patent pledge. The legal disregard for such gratuitous statements 
has roots both in the law of contract and estoppel.326 Such statements are also 
discounted under federal securities laws, in which the so-called “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine limits the liability of issuers for statements of opinion and estimates that are 
fairly interpreted as such.327 
These examples suggest that reliance on patent pledges should be justified only 
to the extent that they are both clear and intended to be binding when made. Thus, 
if market reliance is adopted as a mechanism for the enforcement of patent pledges, 
a body of jurisprudence, agency guidelines, or private sector best practices may need 
to develop surrounding the metes and bounds of enforceable pledges versus 
statements that are too vague, imprecise, or insincere to be enforced. 
                                                     
324 See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that “since there was no clear and unambiguous promise by 
Rambus that it would abide by the JEDEC rules, Hynix does not have a viable promissory 
estoppel claim based upon Rambus’s membership in JEDEC”). The issue of indefiniteness 
of commitments applies equally to estoppel and contract-based arguments. See supra Part 
III.A.2.c. 
325 Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
326  See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (rev. ed. 1993) 
(stating that statements by a seller should not be considered warranties if they would “be 
taken by a reasonable person to be mere ‘puffing’ or expressions of opinion”); see also 
Marable v. Michael J. Auto Sales, 2013 WL 1820811, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 2013) 
(holding that the buyer was not justified in claiming reliance on statements that were mere 
“puffing”). 
327 See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[W]hen an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by 
meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for 
a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the ‘total mix’ of information the 
document provided investors. In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the 
alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.”). See generally 
Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the Application of 
Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L. 243, 267 (1994) 
(discussing the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Donald J. Trump). 
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This is not to say, however, that in most cases it will not be possible to 
determine whether a public statement made by a patent holder is of sufficient 
gravity, formality, and specificity to qualify as an enforceable pledge. In fact, it is 
likely that most such pledges will be easily identifiable as such. As described in Part 
II.B, many patent pledges are made through formal SDO procedures that, while 
falling short of the requirements for common law contract, at least evidence a clear 
intent by the patent holder to be bound and induce action. Even among Type 7 
pledges (Voluntary Non-SDO Declarations), many are written and either publicly 
announced, posted on corporate web sites, or incorporated in correspondence with 
SDOs or regulatory agencies. These pledges, too, should easily fall into the class of 
enforceable promises. 
Some pledges, however, may be less formal. These include statements by 
corporate officers at public meetings and to the press. For example, Verizon’s 
General Counsel recently stated at a recorded law school symposium that his 
company would no longer sell patents to nonpracticing entities. 328  Should this 
statement forever bind Verizon? Was it made with the intention that it be enforced 
as a binding promise? Perhaps. But what if it were not a prepared statement (as it 
appeared to be), but merely a response to a question from an audience member? And 
what if it were phrased in terms of Verizon’s then-current intention, or the speaker’s 
opinion, but not an official corporate position? In such cases, the courts will need to 
develop a set of criteria to distinguish between enforceable patent pledges and 
unenforceable statements, just as they have done with the common law doctrines of 
fraud and deceit. At the end of the day, the question will be whether a particular 
patent pledge was made with the intent to induce market participants to act or forego 
action. 
In some cases, firms may wish to signal to the market that they are making 
enforceable pledges, rather than nonbinding statements of intention or opinion. They 
may do so in a variety of ways, including publishing a statement on their corporate 
website. Another, more permanent, vehicle for indicating that pledges are intended 
to be enforceable is to register them in an online public repository maintained by a 
third party. Publishing a pledge in such a repository would indicate to the public that 
the patent holder wished to go “on record” as making a binding and enforceable 
patent pledge.329  
  
                                                     
328  Colo. Law, Software Patents and Their Challenges Conferences: Panel Three, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2013) (statement of Randal S. Milch, Gen. Counsel, Verizon Commc’ns, 
starting at 40:44), https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQqG1L6RHJEEgDIU2rAjihg, 
archived at http://perma.cc/42C4-68AA (“We have sold patents to nonpracticing entities. 
That’s wrong. I shouldn’t do it. . . . I have made it clear that we are not selling anymore to 
nonpracticing entities.”). 
329  See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 39–44) (proposing 
registry of patent pledges). 
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4.  Reliance and Patent Transfers 
 
As discussed in Part II.D.2 above, the issue of enforcing patent pledges when a 
patent owner has transferred an underlying patent to a new owner has attracted 
significant attention. Commentators have proposed many legal theories under which 
the acquirers of patents could be bound by prior owners’ FRAND commitments and 
other patent pledges, including the Section 5 approach taken by the FTC in N-
Data,330 as well as the other antitrust and servitude theories described in Part III.331 
In addition, some have suggested that SDOs are best equipped to ensure that 
patent pledges travel with pledged patents by imposing policy-based requirements 
on their participants who transfer patents after pledges have been made.332 For 
example, an SDO could require that its participants contractually bind any 
subsequent purchasers of patents to the same pledges they have made and that each 
subsequent purchaser impose a similar commitment on later purchasers.333 This 
“cascading” contractual approach depends on each purchaser in the chain imposing 
the required contractual obligations on the next purchaser. Needless to say, the chain 
is vulnerable to being broken by any purchaser, and if the noncompliant purchaser 
is not an SDO participant, there seems to be little recourse available to implementers 
left without a license. In addition, because patent acquisition transactions are 
typically effected through confidential bilateral agreements, it may be difficult for 
implementers to verify whether patent pledge obligations were, in fact, imposed on 
downstream purchasers as required by the rules of the originating SDO.334 Finally, 
echoing the concerns of Part III.A, an SDO-based cascading contractual approach 
                                                     
330 See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 22, 2008). 
331 See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
at the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9–11 (Oct. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ZSX-JEH8 (antitrust law); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5 (equitable 
servitudes). 
332 See NAS REPORT, supra note 22, at 88–94 (discussing SDO strategies for making 
FRAND commitments binding on subsequent purchasers of patents); ABA PATENT POLICY 
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 84 (describing SDO policy language regarding transfers); 
BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 92 (finding that five of ten SDOs studied impose 
requirements on transferees of patents). 
333 See NAS REPORT, supra note 22, at 89–90 (describing this “cascading” licensing 
obligation and discussing its implementation in the policy documents of ITU/ISO/IEC). This 
approach is similar to that adopted in so-called “copy-left” open source code licenses, which 
impose cascading obligations on subsequent users of an open source code program. See, e.g., 
FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., INC., GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE (2007). 
334 To address this issue, some have proposed a requirement that patent transfers be 
recorded with a governmental agency such as the PTO, along the lines of real property title 
transfers. See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 90–91, 94. Such proposals are still at an early 
stage of discussion and do not extend to the recordation of patent pledges that may affect 
transferred patents. 
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does little to address pledges made by patent holders outside a formal SDO 
disclosure system (e.g., Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations). 
The market reliance theory proposed in this Article offers a different and more 
encompassing approach to making patent pledges binding and enforceable on 
subsequent purchasers. Unlike the cascading contract approach, it focuses on the 
patent holder rather than the patent. If a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement, 
it need not determine whether a patent pledge has been made and carried forward 
with respect to each patent being asserted. Rather, it need only determine whether 
the technology is part of a market characterized by patent pledges and whether the 
patents being asserted were once owned by a party making a patent pledge. If so, 
then the patents in the hands of the new owner (the party asserting them) should 
remain subject to the original owner’s patent pledge. 
While it is still incumbent on the manufacturer to discover, based on PTO 
transfer and assignment records,335 some historical information regarding ownership 
of the patents being asserted, it is generally easier to discover whether a particular 
patent was once owned by a particular party than whether that patent is subject to a 
continuing patent pledge. Moreover, enforcing such pledges based on market 
reliance rather than contract eliminates the risk that a patent owner in the “chain of 
title” has failed to comply with its contractual obligation to impose required 
contractual limitations on downstream purchasers.336  Therefore, market reliance 
represents a more robust and reliable means of ensuring that patent pledges are 
enforced against subsequent holders of pledged patents. 
 
5.  FRAND, Not Fraud 
 
Though the market reliance theory described in this Article borrows from the 
fraud-on-the-market theory under federal securities law, it is not intended to address 
the same conduct as securities fraud actions. A patent holder’s failure to grant a 
license on FRAND terms after it has committed to do so is markedly different than 
a public company’s dissemination of false statements to the market. Patent pledges 
are based on promises, and the market reliance theory is intended to recognize and 
render such promises enforceable, notwithstanding the absence of formal contractual 
trappings or demonstrable specific reliance. This Article borrows from the doctrine 
of fraud-on-the-market only its presumption of reliance based on public statements 
intended to influence market behavior, not its other elements, nor its determination 
of fraud or deceit. While actions for fraud have been brought in the standards 
context, they have arisen primarily in relation to allegedly deceptive conduct—
                                                     
335 The PTO voluntary recordation system for patent transfers is admittedly imperfect. 
See id. at 94 (stating that Recommendation 5.3 encourages more robust recordation 
requirements for patent transfers). 
336 See id. at 90 (raising concern over breaks in the “chain of commitment”). 
2015] MARKET RELIANCE 549 
namely, a failure to disclose patents under an SDO’s policies.337 In other cases, 
claims of fraud have merely been add-ons to complaints asserting breach of contract, 
estoppel, antitrust, and other claims, and have generally remained unaddressed by 
the courts.338 When considered by courts, fraud claims based on the alleged violation 
of FRAND commitments and other activity relating to standards development have 
largely been unsuccessful.339 Thus, unless a patent holder’s conduct involves deceit, 
its commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms, and its actual or alleged failure 
to do so, should not be analyzed under a fraud theory. 
 
6.  Impact Across Pledge Types 
 
The market reliance theory proposed in this Article focuses on the public pledge 
made by the patent holder, rather than the contractual relationship, if any, established 
between the patent holder and the SDO/implementers. This approach addresses the 
diversity of commitment structures more effectively than the application of contract 
doctrine. Thus, except in the relatively rare case of Type 1 commitments (direct 
contracts among SDO participants), market reliance “outperforms” common law 
contract theory in terms of enforcing FRAND commitments and other patent 
pledges. 
One major benefit of the market reliance theory is that it eliminates the need to 
distinguish between SDO members and nonmembers. Under contract theory, SDO 
members are more clearly intended third-party beneficiaries than nonmembers, at 
least from the SDO’s standpoint.340 Under a market reliance theory, however, all 
implementers of a standard, whether or not members of the SDO, are market 
participants and hence entitled to enforce the public promises made by patent 
holders. That is, when FRAND commitments are embodied in agreements between 
                                                     
337 See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1109, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (Prost, J., dissenting in part) (alleging that Rambus deceptively concealed patenting 
activity relevant to memory chip standardization in violation of SDO rules). 
338 See Counterclaim Defendant Apple Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, & Counterclaims in 
Reply to Samsung’s Counterclaims at 70, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 926 F. Supp. 
2d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 11-CV-01846-LHK) (“Samsung’s untimely disclosures of its 
claimed essential IPR and/or false FRAND commitments to ETSI, and its refusal to meet its 
FRAND obligations regarding patents that it claims to be essential to the UMTS standard 
constitute (1) unlawful business acts or practices in violation of the federal antitrust laws and 
the California Cartwright Act, (2) fraudulent conduct and (3) unfair business acts or practices 
. . . .” (emphasis added)); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1240 
(S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that 
in response to Qualcomm’s infringement claim, Broadcom raised defenses of equitable 
estoppel, implied license, fraud, unclean hands, breach of contract, laches, and waiver arising 
from Qualcomm’s alleged violation of its disclosure and FRAND obligations to SDO). 
339 See Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1104–05 (concluding that the action for fraud failed due to 
lack of clarity surrounding the defendant’s disclosure obligations to SDO); cf. supra Part 
III.C.1 (discussing deception cases under antitrust theories). 
340 See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. 
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a patent holder and an SDO (Type 2), or in an SDO’s bylaws or policies (Type 3), 
under common law contract theory, implementers must claim third-party beneficiary 
status to enforce those commitments. While third-party beneficiary status may be 
available, the application of third-party beneficiary rights to large classes of 
undefined persons is subject to a long and checkered history and has lately been 
disfavored by the courts.341 Relying on this doctrine for the enforcement of FRAND 
commitments is thus speculative. In contrast, under the market reliance theory, the 
patent holder’s promises under Type 2 and 3 structures are deemed to be made 
directly to the market and implementers, who may enforce them directly without the 
need to apply an intervening third-party beneficiary analysis. 
Likewise, market reliance is superior to common law contract when FRAND 
commitments are established by letters of assurance (Type 5) and voluntary 
declarations (Type 6 and Type 7). The extension of common law contract theory to 
such unilateral statements of intent is strained, at best. In some of these cases, one 
can find a contractual obligation to make the relevant disclosure, but little to support 
the imposition of contractual duties with regard to the content of that disclosure (e.g., 
the Content Obligation). Under a market reliance theory, however, such public 
statements can be enforced as promises made to the market and its participants. 
Finally, market reliance provides a means for enforcing FRAND commitments 
made in the particularly confusing realm of SDOs that simply follow the ANSI 
patent policy (Type 4). Finding a contractual commitment, and even an appropriate 
contractual counterparty, in these cases is challenging. However, under a market 
reliance theory, FRAND commitments made by patent holders to ANSI, an ANSI-
accredited SDO, or the market generally should all be enforceable by market 
participants. 
Table 3 summarizes the applicability of common law contract versus market 
reliance to each pledge type. 
  
                                                     
341 See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
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Table 3 




Contract Doctrine Market Reliance Prevalence 
1. Multilateral 
Agreement 
Commitment is contractual 
among members; 
nonmember implementers 
will have difficulty relying 
on third-party beneficiary 
(TPB) theory 
Promise contained in private 
multiparty agreement is 
probably not made to the 





Commitment is contractual 
between patent holder and 
SDO; member and 
nonmember implementers 
must rely on TPB theory 
Promise to the market 
embodied in agreement 
between patent holder and 





Commitment is either 
corporate or contractual in 
nature; exists between 
patent holder and SDO; 
member and nonmember 
implementers must rely on 
TPB theory 
Bylaw/policy-based promise 





No affirmative FRAND 
commitment on patent 
holder, merely a 
prescription for SDO 
process; LOAs provided by 
members are probably not 
contractual 
Promise to the market 
contained in LOA is 
enforceable by implementers
Common 
5. Letters of 
Assurance 
(LOA) 
Obligation to provide LOA 
is a contractual 
commitment to SDO; 
commitment contained in 
LOA is probably not 
contractual 
Promise to the market 







declarations are almost 
certainly not contractual 
Promise to the market 
contained in voluntary 
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7.  Remedies 
 
One of the most vexing issues associated with the enforcement of FRAND 
commitments and other patent pledges is how to fashion a remedy when such 
commitments are breached.342 The customary remedy to redress the breach of a 
promise rendered enforceable through promissory estoppel is an award of monetary 
“expectation” damages.343 As with common law contracts, expectation damages are 
intended to restore the injured party to the position in which it would have been save 
for the breach.344 Yet monetary damages awarded to an unlicensed party do not 
achieve the primary purpose of patent pledges: assuring the market that patents will 
not be asserted to prevent the implementation of industry standards or common 
technology platforms. 345  To fulfill the purpose of the pledge and promote the 
widespread adoption of the relevant technology or standard, a license must be 
granted on the promised terms. In other words, specific performance must be 
awarded. 
As the Restatement (Second) explains, “An order of specific performance is 
intended to produce as nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance 
due under a contract would have produced.”346 To achieve this purpose, the terms of 
the contract to be enforced must be sufficiently clear for the court to grant relief.347 
A contract that is indefinite, or a mere agreement to agree, is not amenable to 
enforcement by specific performance.348 
                                                     
342 A remedy would be sought only when the potential infringer asserts breach of a 
patent pledge as an affirmative cause of action. It is also likely, however, that market reliance 
may be raised as a defense against a claim of infringement, in which case dismissal of the 
infringement claim would be the principal relief sought. 
343 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a, d (1981). 
344 See id. § 347 cmt. a. 
345 This is not to say that monetary damages should be entirely out of the question to 
address injuries suffered by a product vendor that was improperly denied a license in 
violation of a patent pledge. Such damages could cover, for example, lost profits during the 
period that the vendor refrained from selling a standardized product due to the lack of a 
license. 
346 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981). 
347 Id. § 362 (“Specific performance . . . will not be granted unless the terms of the 
contract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order.”); see also id. § 
362 cmt. b, illus. 1 (“A and B make a contract under which A promises to convey part of a 
tract of land to B and B promises to pay $100,000 and to build ‘a first class theatre’ on it. 
Building the theatre will enhance the value of A’s remaining land. A conveys the land to B, 
who pays the price but refuses to build the theatre. A sues B for specific performance. 
Specific performance will be refused because of the uncertainty of the terms of the contract, 
although A can receive damages from B based on the failure to enhance the value of his land 
if he can prove them with reasonable certainty.”). 
348 See, e.g., Sanderford v. Duplin Land Dev., Inc., 531 F. App’x. 358, 362 (4th Cir. 
2013) (stating that “a contract ‘leaving material portions open for future agreement is 
nugatory and void for indefiniteness,’” and specific performance will not be awarded 
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In the case of patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in particular, it is 
useful to recall the distinction between Process Obligations and Content 
Obligations.349  Process Obligations are commitments to go through the process 
leading to the grant of a FRAND license or some other required outcome. Content 
Obligations relate to the content of the license that is actually granted, including both 
royalty rates and other terms such as reciprocal license commitments, defensive 
suspension, and the like.350 As discussed above, FRAND commitments and other 
patent pledges relating to the granting of licenses (e.g., royalty-free license 
commitments) are seldom specific as to content, and it is unlikely that specific 
performance would be granted imposing specific license terms on the parties.351 As 
the oft-repeated maxim states, a court will not “make a contract for the parties.”352 
With respect to Process Obligations, however, the court is more likely to 
succeed in fashioning a suitable order for specific performance. In doing so, it has 
several options. First, it could order the parties to negotiate and reach an agreement 
on the terms of a FRAND license agreement. This option, of course, leaves open the 
question of what happens if the parties cannot agree on those terms (which may not 
be unlikely if they are in litigation).353 Second, the court may itself determine certain 
key license terms (such as royalty rate) and order the parties to fashion an agreement 
                                                     
(quoting Cnty. of Jackson v. Nichols, 623 S.E.2d 277, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005))); Quirin v. 
Weinberg, 830 P.2d 537, 541 (Mont. 1992) (“[A] contract to be specifically enforceable must 
be complete and certain in all essential matters included within its scope. Nothing must be 
left to conjecture or surmise, or be so vague as to make it impossible for the court to glean 
the intent of the parties from the instrument . . . .” (quoting Steen v. Rustad, 313 P.2d 1014, 
1020 (Mont. 1957)); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 
543–44 (N.Y. 1981) (“[M]ere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future 
negotiations, is unenforceable. . . . [And this] rule applies all the more, and not the less, when 
. . . the extraordinary remedy of specific performance is sought.” (citations omitted)); Duke 
v. Tobin, 96 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Va. 1957) (“[A] court of equity will not specifically enforce a 
contract unless it be complete and certain. All the essential terms of the contract must be 
finally and definitely settled. None must be left to be determined by future negotiations.”). 
The inability to specifically enforce indefinite agreements has been codified in the statutes 
of some states. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-412(5) (2013) (stating that “an agreement 
the terms of which are not sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done 
clearly ascertainable” cannot be specifically enforced). 
349 See supra Part II.C. 
350 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
351 This is not the case, however, with respect to patent pledges relating to specific 
commitments, such as pledges to refrain from seeking injunctions or from transferring 
pledged patents to nonpracticing entities. These commitments are likely definite enough to 
support specific performance. 
352 Three-O-Three Inv. Inc. v. Moffitt, 622 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) 
(quoting Biggs v. Moll, 463 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Mo. 1971)).  
353 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416941, 
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012) (concluding that “it makes little sense to order the parties to 
continue negotiating a license when they have been unable to reach an agreement through 
five years of negotiations”). 
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around those key terms.354 Third, the court could order the parties to submit to 
binding arbitration to fashion a license agreement, including its key terms. This third 
approach has the benefit of removing the not insubstantial burden of determining 
royalty rates and other licensing terms from the court and placing it in the hands of 
a qualified third party compensated by the litigants.355 And finally, courts could look 
to some combination of judicial or arbitral determinations of key license terms, such 
as royalty rates, and require that other terms of FRAND licenses comply with a 
known industry template agreement.356 While no such template agreement has yet 
been widely accepted for FRAND licensing, the development of such a template 
would not be difficult.357 Thus, a variety of options exist for the granting of specific 
                                                     
354 This option is closer to what the court initially ordered in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, 
Mobility, Inc. See id. (determining that “it makes sense to allow Apple to sue for specific 
performance of Motorola’s contractual obligations and for the court to determine license 
terms, if necessary. In fact, in situations such as this in which the parties cannot agree on the 
terms of a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory license, the court may be the only forum 
to determine license terms”). In a surprising turn of events, however, Apple announced that 
it would not commit to enter into a license agreement with Motorola at any rate the court 
determined. Rather, Apple would “consider” the court’s royalty rate, but reserved the right, 
if the rate exceeded $1.00 per product, to continue with litigation. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola 
Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416931, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012). In 
light of Apple’s position, the court reconsidered Apple’s petition for specific performance, 
which asked “whether it was appropriate for a court to undertake the complex task of 
determining a FRAND rate if the end result would be simply a suggestion that could be used 
later as a bargaining chip between the parties.” Id. The court’s answer was negative: it reversed 
its earlier decision and denied Apple’s motion for specific performance. Id.  
355 Arbitration of disputes concerning standards-essential patents has gained significant 
currency recently and has been noted with approval in the FTC’s consent order in Motorola 
Mobility, LLC, No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 124100, at *11–12 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013), as well as 
the European Commission’s settlement with Samsung, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1160 (2013); Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, 
Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 23, 23; Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the 
Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 2, 4; 
EC Google/Motorola Mobility Decision, supra note 239; EC Samsung Press Release, supra 
note 239 (noting that arbitrators, in addition to courts, are “well equipped” to determine 
FRAND-compliant reasonable royalty rates); Hesse, supra note 331, at 10. 
356 Courts have also shown a willingness to grant specific performance of incomplete 
bargains that involve the use of template agreements. See, e.g., Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 
671, 676–77 (Ind. 1996) (ordering specific performance of a real estate purchase option when 
the parties had agreed on a description of the property, the purchase price, and a time frame 
for closing, and consented to the use of a standardized real estate purchase form to 
memorialize their agreement). 
357  Standardized contracts developed through collaborative mechanisms can both 
reduce transaction costs and assure balanced treatment of issues. See Mark R. Patterson, 
Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52 
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performance of patent pledges enforced through the market reliance theory proposed 
in this Article. 
 
8.  Implementing Theory in Law 
 
The market reliance theory and its rebuttable presumption of reliance represent 
a modest, albeit critical, modification to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the 
                                                     
WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 377–80 (2010). Industry-specific template agreements have been 
adopted successfully in a number of different markets from online advertising, e.g., Terms 
and Conditions, INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU, http://www.iab.net/guidelines/508676/tscs 
3, archived at http://perma.cc/MVU9-X3YN (last visited Feb. 4, 2015), to residential real 
estate, e.g., CAL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, SAN FRANCISCO PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND JOINT 
ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS (2011), available at http://www.car.org/media/pdf/legal/standard-
forms/507939/, archived at http://perma.cc/7QHH-2N4D. In addition, standardized 
intellectual property license agreements, most notably the Creative Commons suite of 
content licenses, see About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, www.creativecommons.org 
/licenses/, archived at http://perma.cc/H4RV-6RX4 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015), have gained 
widespread acceptance. 
While a detailed program for the development of an industry standard FRAND license 
template is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that there are several neutral 
bodies that could act as facilitators for such a project. For example, a committee of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) acted as the facilitator in drafting the Model Trading 
Partner Agreement for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), which has become the de facto 
standard for EDI transactions. See JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at 5-62 (4th ed. 2012); Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, The 
Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner 
Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990). The ABA has also been active in the area of 
technical standardization, and two of its committees have produced reference works that are 
widely used in the field. See ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5; ABA ANTITRUST 
HANDBOOK, supra note 198. Another potential facilitator is ANSI, which represents the 
interests of the U.S. standards community and has approximately 230 SDO members. See 
About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/over 
view.aspx?menuid=1, archived at http://perma.cc/5BBT-R9VF (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); 
Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS 
INST., http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.aspx?menuid 
=3, archived at http://perma.cc/HQC6-ZAL2 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). As discussed above, 
the ANSI Essential Requirements form is the basis for many SDO patent policies, lending 
substantial legitimacy to any such ANSI-led activity. See supra text accompanying notes 72–
74. ANSI also has a well-organized Intellectual Property Rights Policy Committee that 
represents a broad cross section of the standardization community, and it meets regularly and 
forms task groups to address issues of interest to the membership. Intellectual Property 
Rights Policy Committee (IPRPC), AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., 
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/structure_management/policy_commit_councils/intel_right
s.aspx?menuid=1, archived at http://perma.cc/7LN7-E6YS (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
Finally, it is possible that a neutral governmental agency such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) could convene such an effort and help to ensure that its 
results were acceptable to a broad range of constituents. 
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context of patent pledges. The clearest path to adoption of such a presumption would 
be through judicial recognition.358 Courts are well equipped to develop common law 
doctrine and have done so for centuries. The doctrines of promissory estoppel and 
the common law of contracts are both the products of gradual judicial development. 
In contrast, the rapid judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market theory was 
remarkable given the centuries of common law precedent surrounding actions for 
fraud and deceit. 359  Nevertheless, the courts, when confronted with a legal 
framework that was ill-suited to address the realities of modern markets, recognized 
the need to adapt these traditional common law rules with contemporary theory and 
supporting empirical data. It is hoped that courts considering cases involving 
FRAND commitments and other patent pledges may find the market reliance theory 
useful and adopt it as a general theory for enforcing patent pledges. 
While judicial recognition of the market reliance doctrine would help to address 
current uncertainty, judicial adoption occurs sporadically as cases are brought, and 
there is no assurance that such adoption would be rapid or widespread.360 A more 
general and timely solution could potentially be achieved through legislative action. 
As noted throughout this Article, patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in 
particular, are key elements of the technology infrastructure. As such, they should 
be as strongly and transparently enforceable as possible. Legislation clarifying that 
such commitments are enforceable promises and establishing by statute the 
presumption of reliance that is proposed in this Article, as well as the binding effect 
of patent pledges on subsequent purchasers of pledged patents, would significantly 
benefit the technology marketplace by reducing uncertainty and litigation.361 Such 
                                                     
358 Cf. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 104–06 (2009) (arguing that in the area of patent law, judicial rather than 
legislative solutions are more likely to be effective and within reach). 
359 See supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text (noting the rapid adoption of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory in judicial decisions). 
360 As noted above, judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which was 
regarded as remarkably quick, took over a decade. 
361 The operative language of such legislation would be relatively straightforward. For 
example: 
 
SEC. X. ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT PLEDGES. 
(a) Definitions.—In this section— 
(1) the term ‘covered person’ means a person who has an interest in the 
manufacture, sale, use, or import of a product or process that would, or is likely 
to, infringe a patent subject to a patent pledge, either directly or contributorily, or 
that would induce infringement of such patent; 
(2) the term ‘patent pledge’ means a statement, commitment, promise, or 
pledge made by a controlling party regarding the licensing or nonassertion of a 
patent (including a patent not yet issued at the time the patent pledge is made), 
whether the patent is specifically identified or part of a defined group or portfolio 
of patents, that is— 
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legislation could be effected through a relatively modest amendment to the Patent 
Act; 362  the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 
(SDOAA),363 a statute enacted a decade ago to insulate SDOs from certain antitrust 
claims; or one of the several bills currently proposed to address various aspects of 
the U.S. patent system.364  
In addition to judicial and legislative recognition of the market reliance theory, 
either federal agencies or Congress may wish to consider legal incentives to 
encourage firms to make patent pledges, or to register them in a public repository as 
discussed in Part IV.B.3 above. Such incentives might include lessening the antitrust 
penalties for allegedly anticompetitive conduct involving pledged patents,365 akin to 
the relief from treble damages available to SDOs under the Standards Development 
Organization Advancement Act.366  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Patent pledges are intended to preserve the many social welfare benefits 
afforded by the broad adoption of interoperability standards and other technology 
                                                     
(A) made to the public or in a manner intended to be known by the public; 
and 
(B) intended to be binding on the controlling party; and 
(3) the term ‘controlling party’ shall include any owner, assignee, transferee, 
licensee, or other person having the authority to license or enforce a patent. 
(b) Binding Effect.—A patent pledge shall be binding upon and obligate (i) 
the controlling party originally making such patent pledge and (ii) any subsequent 
controlling party to the same degree as the controlling party that originally made 
the patent pledge. 
(c) Enforcement.—A covered person may bring a civil action to enforce a 
patent pledge against any controlling party that is bound by such patent pledge 
pursuant to subsection (b). 
(d) Presumption of Reliance.—A covered person shall not be required to 
demonstrate actual reliance on a patent pledge in order to succeed in enforcement 
under subsection (c). 
 
362 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–42 (2012). 
363 Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
4301–06 (2012)). 
364 See, e.g., Jimmy Hoover, Patent Reform to Get New Life in GOP-Led Congress, 
LAW 360 (Jan. 29, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/616444?utm_source 
=shared-articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles, archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZLN3-3VVR (discussing bills likely to emerge in the 115th Congress); see 
also Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (including provisions relating to 
disclosure of the real parties in interest, discovery and joinder, and fee shifting, and 
correcting several defects in the America Invents Act); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 
2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013) (seeking “[t]o deter abusive patent litigation by targeting 
the economic incentives that fuel frivolous lawsuits”).  
365 See supra Part III.C. 
366 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–06 (2012).  
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platforms by assuring the market that patents will not be used to block the 
manufacture and sale of products conforming to such standards. As such, it is critical 
that FRAND commitments and other patent pledges be binding and enforceable. 
However, the currently prevailing contractual understanding of commitments is both 
inaccurate and incomplete. While the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel 
more closely hews to the nature of such commitments, its requirement of actual 
detrimental reliance is problematic. 
This Article recognizes the public character of FRAND commitments with a 
novel “market reliance” theory that combines aspects of traditional promissory 
estoppel with the federal securities fraud-on-the-market doctrine. This approach, 
which focuses on a patent holder’s reliance-inducing statements to the market at 
large, avoids the artificial application of inapposite doctrinal constructs to promises 
that do not fit the contractual mode. It would make patent pledges binding and 
enforceable whether made in an SDO setting or in a broader statement to the market, 
and it would make such pledges enforceable against subsequent purchasers of 
pledged patents. Recognizing patent pledges as the market-wide assurances they are 
intended to be, whether through the courts or Congress, will create a stronger and 
more defensible foundation for the enforcement of these crucial commitments.  
